

Repo Markets

Experiences and opportunities in Hungary



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Preface

More and more questions have arisen recently in the National Bank of Hungary about repo markets. The topic came into the limelight with the latest changes of monetarypolicyinstruments. Inaddition, speculative activity on repo markets has given rise to some interesting questions.

We have tried to sum up the main characteristics of reposbeginning with the definitions and with the practices of international and Hungarian repo markets. We have attempted to investigate whether the size of the Hungarian repo market is really as insignificant as statistics show. Finally, we make a few suggestions which may increase the effectiveness of monetary policy by the stimulation of repo markets. Given that Hungarian literature on this topic is very scarce, our study is mainly based on foreign publications and consultations with market participants.

When analysing the Hungarian repo market we faced a lot of problematic questions, some of them we have already met, others we faced here for the first time. These problems arise because of the lack of overall regulation, the misinterpretation of existing regulations, the reservere quire ments of the National Bank, the set tle ment and accounting standards of repos, and because of the insufficient knowledge of market participants.

We would like to express our spe cial thanks to Dr Éva Istvánovics and Dr Krisztina Bana for their help with legal questions, and to Balázs Romhányi and Enikő Gyulafalvi for the translation of German and French publications. We would also like to thank all those people who helped us with their remark able ideas and experiences in creating this study.

1. Definition and the different types of repo


repos con sist of a loan of se curities in one di rection and a loan of cash in the other The name 'repo' comes from the expression 'sale and repurchase agree ment' and cov ers a trans action where the two parties in volved agree to do two deals as a pack age. The first deal is a prompt sale of a security – most of ten a gov ern ment bond – fol lowed by a re verse trans action on a fu ture date. The first deal of the trans action is of ten called the *first leg*, while the fu ture deal is usu ally called the *second leg* of the repo. Because the cash and security transfers of the first leg are re versed on a fu ture date, repo deals are equiv a lent to a loan of securi ties in one di rection and a loan of cash in the other.

According to the typical repo agreement, rights connected to the borrowed securities (income and capital gains/losses) remain with their orig i nal owner. Repos are driven by ei ther the need to lend or bor row cash – which is collateralised by securities – or the need to borrow specific securities. Prices of the prompt sale and the subsequent repurchase are agreed at the outset. The difference between the two prices is calculated to be equiv a lent to the cost of a secured loan.

the two (es sen tial) par ties of a repo The two (essential) parties of a repo are the **seller** (or lender), who sells his securi ties at the prompt deal and re pur chases them on a future date, and the **buyer** (or borrower or investor) who grants a collateralised cash loan. This terminology is taken from the bond market, not the money market – the party bor row ing cash is usu ally known as the lender in the repo.

If the repo is driven by the investor's purpose of lending money, he is not interested in the exact conditions (yield, maturity etc.) of the collateral, though it is important for him that the collateral is tradable and that the is suer is credit-worthy. This is why govern ment papers are the most frequently used securities as collateral.

Repos can be driven by the need of security borrowing if the buyer is short of a partic u lar se curity. In this case it is very im por tant for him to re ceive the spe cific se curi ties he is short of – thus the collateral is called **special**, as opposed to **general collateral** (GC). The extent to which any particular security becomes special depends on the supply of, and demand for that security in the market generally. The more special the security, the lower the repo interest rate can be.



Repos generally have short maturityvarying between one day (O/N) and one year. Flex i ble maturity is one of the main at tractions of repo – it gives a wide range of possibilities for investing cash on differ ent time horizons. Yet this is only one ad van tage of repos. Since repos are collateralised loans, the low risk makes them very popular withinvestors. If the seller defaults in repaying the cash, the buyer (investor) can keep the collateralised securities. It is advisable for the investor to check the creditworthiness of both the seller and the is suer of the col lat eral prior to the deal. The ad van tage of the repo for the bor rower of the cash is that he can make use of an investment in his portfolio to borrow funds either relatively cheaply, or which he might not otherwise be able to bor row at all.

1.1 Main types of repo

Repos can be classified by many factors. In terms of maturity a differ ence can be made be tween **term** and **open** (or *day-to-day*) **repo**. If the period is not fixed and agreed in advance, it is an 'open repo'. In this case both parties have the right to call for the repo to be terminated at any time, al though of ten re quir ing two days' no tice. In an open repo, the repo in ter est rate changes each day – effect vely the repo is rolled over each day. The alternative is a 'term repo', where the ma tu rity of the repo is fixed and agreed in ad vance.

the main at trac tions of repo

repos can be clas si fied by many fac tors from the view point of the coun ter parts

the own er ship of the collateral

buys the securities in the first deal and resells them on the future date. If the own er ship of the col lat eral is trans ferred to the buyer, the deal is called a **deliveryrepo**. The buyer has the right to use the se curi ties dur ing the term of the repo, but is obliged to re turn them to the seller at ma turity. If the se curi ties are pledged for the ben e fi ciary of the buyer, but the own er ship re mains with the seller, the deal is called a **hold-in-custody repo**. If the seller defaults on repaying the cash loan at the end of the deal, the ownership of the securities is auto-

From the viewpoint of the counterparts a repo can be repo or

reverse repo. The same transaction is a repo for the seller, who sells his securities on the first leg and repurchases them on the future date, while it is a reverse repo (or sim ply reverse) for the buyer, who

matically trans ferred to the buyer. Repos can be subdivided into three basic constructions: the classic repo, the buy/sell-back and securities lending. The economics of the deal is the same in all three cases.

1.1.1 Classic repo

clas sic repo con tracts are usu ally based on the PSA agree ment Classic repo contracts are usually based on the PSA agreement in the USA, while in Eu rope the PSA/ISMA Global Mas ter Repo Agreement is the most widely used stan dard.

Coupon payments (of the col lat eral) during the term of de livery repo are received by the buyer, who is obliged to make a matching payment to the seller at the end of the deal. In the case of a hold-in-custody repo, the securities remain in the seller's possession, thus coupon payments are received by him, too.

In international practice, repos generally involve gross-paying securities, that is securities where the is suer pays the coupons gross, without deduction of income tax. The GMRA is designed for gross-paying securities. Under the GMRA, if the buyer does receive any pay ments of net tax, he is still liable to pay the gross amount to the seller. Clearly the two parties in volved can in stead es tab lish a differ ent agree ment for net-paying securities if they chose.

Price calculation

the price of the repo is the repo in ter est rate The price of the repo is the repo interest rate, which appears as the difference of the cash flows in the two legs of the repo. In the spot trans action the bor rower pays the price of the security and in the future deal he gets back the same amount plus the ac crued repo in terest. Since securities transacted in repo deals are used as collateral,

the price paid for them can differ from the actual market price – it usu ally contains a hair cut (or in some cases a dis count).

In the case of a hold-in-custody repo, the cash flow of the second leg contains only the orig i nal pur chase price and the repo in terest rate, but it does not contain the interest on the security accrued during the term of the repo. The reason for this is that the papers remain in the prop erty of the seller and so the cash-flows involved are cred ited on his ac count.

In a delivery repo, the property of the collateral passes to the buyer, so he will be receiving the actual coupon payments. These inflows must be repaid to the seller at the end of the deal.

Cash flows of the repo

Cash flow of the first leg = nominal amount of bond x (net price + accrued interest) / 100

Cash flow of the sec ond leg:

Hold-in-custody repo: spot cash flow x (1 + repo in ter est x term of the repo / 360 or 365²)

De liv ery repo: spot cash flow x (1 + repo in ter est x term of the repo / 360 or 365) + acccrued in ter est dur ing the term of the repo x (1 + repointerest x T),

where T = num ber of days be tween coupon pay ment and the maturity of repo/360 v. 365.

the driv ing forces of repos

The calculation above supposes that the deal is driven by the seller's need to lend a particular amount of securities. Here the cash flows are to be calculated on the basis of the nom inal amount and the conditions of the bond transacted. This is typical with **security-driven** repos when the lender does not need his securities for a certain period of time and he wants to make use of his port folio. An other group of repos are based on the need for lending or borrowing money; these are the so called **cash-driven repos**. In cash-driven deals the amount of cash lent is given, so the nominal amount of securities trans acted needs to be calculated.

Calculation of cash-driven deals

Nom i nal amount of se curi ties = spot cash flow/ (net price + ac crued in ter est) / 100

Cash flow on the future date = spot cash flow x (1 + repo interest rate x term of repo / 360 or 365)

¹ Repo cal cu la tions can be based ei ther on 360 or 365 days de pend ing on the coun ter parts. Banks prefer us ing 360 days as a stan dard for the inter bank mar ket, and bro Ker age firms rather use the 365-day year as it is usual for bond cal cu la tions.

Collateral management

The price of the col lat eral dur ing the term of the repo can change as market interest rates vary. To balance these price changes it is advisable to recalculate the value of the collateral daily and to check whether the ac tual market value of the securi ties equals the value of the cash lent. Should the value of the collateral fall, the buyer may require a margin call, which means that the seller needs to transfer extra collateral or cash to the buyer. If the value of the collateral rises rather than falls, the seller can sim i larly make a mar gin call, requir ing the buyer to re turn some of the col lat eral.

daily mark ing-to-market US high hair cut Revaluation of the collateral (mark ing to market) is usually exercised daily. If the haircut (or initial margin) is high enough, daily marking to market is not necessary. High hair cut means dis ad vantage for the seller who gets less cash for the same amount of security than he would receive by daily marking to market. For the lender, high haircut is advantageous because he is covered even at higher price falls of the collateral (as long as the haircut is higher than the price loss).

Haircutcalculation

Cash paid at first leg = (nom i nal amount of bond x (net price + ac crued in ter est) / 100 / (1 + hair cut rate)

Cash re paid at the sec ond leg = cash paid at the be gin ning x (1 + repo in ter est rate xnumber of days / 360 or 365)

The extent of hair cut rate depends both on the type of col lat eral man age ment ap plied and on the cred i bil ity of the counter parts. If the credibility of the seller is higher than that of the buyer, the amount of the cash lent can exceed the value of the collateral. Since bond prices are constantly chang ing, there would be small trans fers of collateral each day if the collateral value were always to be marked to market precisely. To avoid the administrative costs and burden of this, the two parties agree a **threshold**, below which changes in the col lat eral's value do not trig ger a mar gin call.

When marking to market the collateral, it is the dirty price including accrued coupon that is considered, because this is the amount of money which could be realised by the buyer by selling the collateral if necessary. Sim i larly, the amount of cash which is secured by the collateral takes account of accrued interest on the cash. In some markets, where the securities set the ment system is not ready for daily mark ing to market, read justing the value of the collateral can be implemented by closing the original transaction and opening a new repo deal with the same maturity and value as the original. In some cases the new deal is not based on the cash lent but on the amount of securities transacted in the original deal. This is usual when the repo is security-driven.

Substitution

If counter parts agree (and the set tle ment system is well enough developed), it might be possible to replace the original collateral with other securities during the term of the repo. If the deal is not security- but cash-driven, it is not important for the buyer to receive a partic ular bond as collateral. How ever, it is important that the collateral has the required credibility and value both before and after the substitution. The number of substitutions allowed during a repo is usually settled in the repo agreement. Substitution is generally not allowed with security-driven repos, since it would negate the original purpose of the buyer.

The following section describes some of the most popular subtypes of classic repo.

Bilateral, tri-party and hold-in-custody repos

Repos dis cussed above had one thing in com mon: they all had two counterparts. These are the so called bilateral repos. It may occur, though, that the two parties hire a tri-party agent as a custodian. In this case the seller transfers the se curi ties to the tri-party agent, who keeps the papers on a separate account on the buyer's behalf. The custodian's duties include:

- as sur ing DVP set tle ment at each end of the deal;
- daily report ing of the value of collateral for both parties;
- en sur ing that the col lat eral sat is fies the buyer's criteria in all respect;
- daily marking to market in or der to ensure that the collateral isadequate;
- overseeinganysubstitution.

The agree ment with the cus to dian is set tled in a sep a rate con tract be tween the three parties. The cus to dian's fee charges the seller. In Eu rope Euroclear and Cedel – in ter-

to re place the orig i nal col lateral with other securities

risks can be low ered by hir ing a triparty agent national clear ing houses – are the two main cus to di ans in volved in cross-border repo set tle ments, while in the US it is the Bank of New York or the Chem i cal Bank.


The Hun gar ian Cen tral De pos i tory and Clear ing House (KELER) signed a cus to dian agreement with Cedel Bank in 1996. Under this agreement it is now possible for Cedel-client for eign investors to directly set the their Hun gar ian securi ties trans actions. The agree ment also made possible for cross-border securi ties trans actions of Hun garian banks, bro ker age firms and cus to dian banks to be set the through Keler, and for their rights connected to the securities to be exercised while holding the papers at Keler.

ad van tage and dis advan tage of the tri-party repo With a tri-party repo it is a disadvantage for the buyer that he cannot use the securities during the term of the repo. However, it is ben eficial for the seller be cause he has the possibility of substitution. If, for ex ample, he needs the collateral for an other trans action during the term of the repo, he can substitute the orig in al papers with other adequate securities on the buyer's account. The partic i pation of the third party is advantageous for the buyer be cause it guar an tees that the collateral is uniquely used for the repo. There are some other advantages of the tri-party repo for the buyer:

- the seller might pay higher reported for the possibility of substitution;
- low partnerrisk secured by the independent custodian;
- low administrative and legal costs.

Tri-party repo was initially used exclusively by central banks for obtaining more security in settlements. Market participants began us ing this form of repo later. Se curity of set tle ment cer tainly has its price: lo cal cus to di ans of de vel oped mar kets usu ally charge a fee of 1.5–4 basis points for repo settlements. Fees usually decrease pro por tion ally with the in crease of quan tity. At the end of 1997, 70% of the one trillion dollar American O/N repo market involved tri-party repos. At the same time, according to Euroclear reports, only 25% of the 170 billion dollar turnover on the European O/N repo mar ket was trans acted as tri-party repos. Al though the pro portion of tri-party repos is constantly growing, the growth is limited both by the ex tra costs and the infrastructural burdens of depositories.

differencebetween theclassical hold-in-custody repo and tri-party repo If the term of repo is very short or if the seller wishes to make substitution, the transfer costs of the securities might end up relatively too high. The **classical hold-in-custody repo** eliminates this problem by leaving the securities on the seller's segregated account. For the buyer, this certainly means a higher partner risk, which enables him to ask for higher repo rate. As in the case of tri-party repo, the buyer does not have the right to use the col lat eral during the clas-



sical hold-in-custody repo. This type of repo is very convenient for the seller, because all the administration is car ried out by the cus todian, and in ad di tion he has the right for sub sti tu tion. It is note wor thy that the col lat eral can only be used for one deal at a time.

Repos of the Na tional Bank of Hun gary (NBH) are tri-party repos rather than class i cal hold-in-custody repos. The security set the ment is done by a third party (KELER), as is usual with tri-party repos, but the cash settlement is done by the NBH, not by KELER.

The seg re ga tion of the securi ties and cash set tle ment is due to the fact that KELER is not author ised to open cash settlement accounts for its clients; that is done by the NBH in the case of banks. The set tle ment of repos is DVP, thanks to the so called "hot line" connection be tween KELER and NBH.

The securi ties set the ment system in Hun gary is not yet prepared for substitution during the term of repos. Be cause of the rel a tively short maturity of repos in Hun gary, substitution has not been a real need un til now (NBH repos are mainly O/N, only the recently in troduced and very rarely applied quick ten der repos and the not yet applied normal ten der repos might have maturity lon ger than one day). The importance of substitution is much higher with mar ket repos (see later).

It does not seem nec es sary to change the NBH's repos from hold-in-custody type to delivery repos. Dur ing the term of repos, the NBH does not use the col lat eral, it only serves as guar an tee.

Delivery repo would be beneficial for the counter parts of the NBH in the case of reverse repos, be cause they might in tend to use the securi ties during the period of repo.

OCCASIONAL PAPERS

Variations of classic repo

As a result of the diversified demand, the market in novated a largevariety of sub types of the classic repo.

Equityrepo

Repos are not al ways collateralised with gov ern ment bonds. Since the begin ning of the 1990s, repos collateralised by equities be came in creas ingly popular. The birth of equity repo was boosted by investment companies seek ing at trac tive op por tunities to make use of their large equity port folio. Of fer ing equities as collateral for repos made it possible to draw loans with more favourable conditions than normal bank credits. This new type of repo was also attractive for investors with temporary high liquidity, because they could gain higher re turn on equity repos than on nor mal repos. (The rea son for this is that the higher risk of equities caused by their higher price vol a tility and lower liquid ity in volves higher profit expect at ions.)

Op tion repo

This type of repo is most widely used in France (they call it vente a remerée) and it is quite wide spread in Hun gary, too. In an op tion repo, one of the counterparts writes an option to fulfil his obligations on the second leg of the repo. This means that ei ther the se curi ties or the cash trans fer at the end of the deal will be op tional, which in creases the risk for the counterpart and it gives a pos si bil ity for him to mod ify the repo rate.

Cross-currency repo

If the cash and the security trans ferred in the repo are de nom i nated in different currencies, the deal is called cross-currency repo. In this case the se curity has higher vol a til ity than in a nor mal repo, be cause its price is determined by both the interest rate and the exchange rate movements. To com pen sate for this, the buyer may re quire a higher repo rate.

Dol lar repo

In a dol lar repo, the buyer has the right to re-sell different papers than the original at the end of the deal. The nominal value of the securities transferred at each end of the deal have to be equal.

For ward start repo

The first leg of a repo is normally settled on the usual settlement date for the security involved. In a forward start repo, the first leg is settled on a pre-agreed fu ture date.

Flex repo

In a flex repo the cash is re paid to the buyer in stages. This is use ful, for example, when the seller is us ing the repo to finance the pur chase of an amort sing as set such as a mort gage-backed se curity.

Floating rate repo

In this, generally a longer-term repo, the repo interest rate is re-set at pre-determined intervals according to such benchmark such as LIBOR. In France, floating rate repos based on the do mes tic TMP in dex are common.

ReversetoMaturity

In a reverse to ma turity, the ma turity date of the repois the same as the maturity date of the security used as collateral. The reverse to maturity is basically equal to the out right selling of the security used as collateral.

1.1.2 Buy/sell-back

Buy/sell-back (B/S) is very sim i lar to classic repo. The difference is that, unlike in a classic repo, the two legs of the deal are handled within two contracts. Buy/sell-backs are basically the consequences of two straightforward purchase agreements, where the economics of the deal are the same as with a classic repo.

the two legs of the deal are set tled within two con tracts

Coupon payments

If there is a coupon payment on the security during the term of buy/sell-back, it is received by the buyer in the same way as in a classic repo. In contrast to a classic repo, how ever, it is typ i cally not then paid over to the counterparty. Clearly, this affects the eco nomics of the deal, as the counterparty needs to be compensated. The compensation is usually taken into ac count in the pricing of the security.

If there is no cou pon pay ment dur ing the term of buy/sell-back, the cash amount paid at the end of the deal can be cal cu lated as below.

Cash paid at the end of the buy/sell-back

Cash paid at the end of the deal = (orig i nal pur chase price + ac crued in ter est) x (1 + B/S in ter est x t),

where: t= period in days / 360 v. 365.

If there is coupon pay ment during the term of deal, the cash repaid at the end must be decreased by the amount of the coupon received by the buyer. Since the buyer has the possibility of investing the coupon received during the term of the deal, his earning on this also needs to be de ducted from the seller's re pay ment. (A usual assump tion is that the coupon can be in vested at the orig i nal reporate; although unlikely to be correct, the effect of using a different rate would gen er ally be very small.)

The general formula for calculating the cash repayment in a buy/sell-back with coupon payment is the following.

Cash flow at the end of a buy/sell-back with cou pon pay ment

Cash flow at the end = (orig i nal pur chase price + ac crued in ter est) x (1 + B/S in ter est x t) – cou pon pay ment x (1 + repo in ter est rate x T),

where: t = term of B/S in days / 360 or 365, and T = days be tween cou pon pay ment and the ma tu rity of B/S / 360 or 365.

If there are any other payments due on the collateral during the buy/sell-back, these need to be taken into account in the same way as coupon pay ments.

nosubstitution within buy/sell-backs As the two legs of the trans ac tion are sep a rate, there is no possibility of substituting one security for another. The only possibility for the two parties is to agree to close out the existing buy/sell-back and establish a new deal based on the same B/S rate and maturity, but with a different collateral.

The advantages and disadvantages of buy/sell-back compared with classic repo

Disadvantagesofbuy/sell-back:

- Traditionally, buy/sell-backs have no special contractual close-out rights in the case of a de fault, since there is no le gal documentation specify events of default. The inclusion of buy/sell-backs in the revised PSA/ISMA documentation, however, allows for this.
- Buy/sell-backs have no marginingrights, although in practice an initial margin may be taken, and variation margin can be achieved through closing out and repricing the transaction, and this is now covered under the PSA/ISMA agreement.
- In buy/sell-backs, the seller of a security has no right to the return of any cou pon, and so must fac tor the ex pected cou-

pon into the buy-back price. In prac tice there might be an under stand ing that the buyer will com pen sate the seller if he receives a coupon which, through oversight, has not been factored into the for ward price.

- There are no rights of sub sti tu tion in buy/sell-backs, al though a buyer may be prepared to accept this in practice through close-out and repricing.
- The ability to net obligations, in the case of default, reduces counterparty risk. This is increasingly recognised by central banksindeterminingcapitaladequacy requirements, so that un doc u mented buy/sell-backs may im ply higher cap i tal re quirements. Again, the revised PSA/ISMA documentation does al low net ting and close-out for buy/sell-backs.

Advantagesofbuy/sell-back:


- A buy/sell-back is easier to book than a classic repo, as it does not require systems for mark ing-to-market and margining.
- Lack of documentation may reduce legal costs and shorten the approval process.
- In con trast with clas sic repo, buy/sell-back is definitely not a credit deal but two simultaneous purchases, which in some countries (including Hungary) involves an advantage for banks in terms of reserver equire ments.

1.1.3 Securities lending

As mentioned earlier, a certain part of repo deals are security-driven, which means that the deal is motivated by the buyer's need to borrow a particular security. It may be, however, that the lender of the security does not wish cash in return; if he is already cash-rich, then borrowing more cash which he would then need to place on de posit would prob a bly cost him the bid-offer spread. Nevertheless, he wishes to take advantages of the fact that he owns a security in short supply. In this case he simply lends the securities for a fee. This type of transaction is called security lending (or stock lending).

Cer tainly, the lender wishes to be se cured against de fault by the borrower, and he takes collateral from the borrower, usually in the form of securities. Collateral is not necessarily some kind of securities, it can be anything that is accepted by the lender. In practice, gov ern ment papers are most com monly used as collateral, but CD's, cash, banker's ac cep tan ces, etc. can also be used.

col lat eral can be any thing that is ac cepted by the lender



Securities lending transactions are treated under one agreement like classic repos. The standard documentation generally used in the UK for international lending transactions is the 'Overseas Securities Lender's Agreement' (OSLA) or the 'Equity Stock Lending Agreement' (ESLA), depending on whether the collateral is bond or equities. In the US, the documentation used is the PSA's 'Master Securities Loan Agreement'.

the ab so lute le gal title is not al ways trans ferred to the borrower In securities lending, the absolute legal title is not al ways transferred to the borrower as in classic de livery repoor buy/sell-backs. Under the OSLA agreement, owner ship of the securities lent is transferred from lender to borrower, and ownership of the collateral is transferred from bor rower to lender. Under the PSA doc umentation, however, the transfer of collateral involves a pledge rather than an outright transfer of owner ship.

If a coupon or other payment is payable on the security lent during the transaction, it is the borrower who receives it, and he is obliged to make a matching payment to the lender to compensate him for the loss of the in come. Sim i larly, if there is a pay ment on the collateral, the lender is obliged to make a matching payment to the borrower. In securities lending transactions where the collateral is only pledged with no transfer of ownership the coupon continues to be paid to the original owner.

Other rights attached to the col lat eral (such as vot ing rights or rights to convert the security to different security) are transferred to the lender only if the agreement allows it. In the case of a bearer security, the current holder of the security (who is the borrower) can exercise the voting rights. The treatment may include the provision that the bor rower has to ex er cise the rights at tached to the se cu rity lent ac cord ing to the lender's wish.

Securities lending in the practice of clearing houses

If the trader is short of the particular securities he needs to sell on the set tle ment date, well-developed clear ing houses are able to settle the transaction by their automated securities-lending systems. Automaticsecurities lending provides the assurance that the buyer receives the securities al ways on the set tle ment date. The clear ing house borrows the particular securities from the members of the lending pool and lends the papers to the seller, who is obliged to return the papers within a certain time. He usually has one-two days to buy the papers in the market. Automated securities lending has especially great importance with multinetting systems, because here the default of one single player can ruin the settlement of all deals of the given day.

In Hun gary, there is an au to mated se cu ri ties lend ing system connected to KELER's T+2 government bond set tlement system. The system operates as follows.

Dealers, who have a securi ties ac count with KELER, deposit their government papers (which they don't need temporarily) in the so-called 'technical government paper pool'. The clear ing mem bers of the T+2 set tle ment system who are short of the securities at T+1 are au to mat i cally cred ited with the papers they lack, un less the pool does not have the required paper or the mem ber does not have the cash value of the required securities on his ac count.

The period of the security-loan can not be more than three days. Au to matic lending is implemented on the afternoon of T+1, when there are no more transfers on the accounts. Set the ment is done on T+2, and the bor rower re turns the pa pers on T+3. After this, KELER cred its the ac count of the lender with the re turned pa pers.

This securities lending system is indirect, which means that all the members have agreements with KELER; they don't necessarily know each other. KELER does not take guarantee against companies taking part in the securities lending. It main tains the ac counts needed for the securities lending, makes the registrations, keeps contacts with the lend ers, monitors collaterals, es tab lishes limits and implements emergency measures in case of de fault. Un til now, there has been no need for the au tomated securities lending, because there have not been any defaults since the implement at ion of the system.

A securities lend ing system can en hance the security of a lo cal settlement system if the security pool contains a large quantity of papers with appropriate quality. It works only if the system assures high security and attractive yield for its members, and does not charge the bor row ers too high fees. automaticsecurities lending


automaticsecurities lend ing en hances the security of set tlement systems

1.1.4 TR swap as an example of synthetic repo


combination of other trans actions called syn thetic repos Repos can be substituted by a combination of other transactions. These (non straightforward deals) are called synthetic repos. Buy/sell-backs are also ex am ples of syn thetic repos, but be cause of their pop u larity they are considered as a sub type of repos.

A little bit more complicated than the buy/sell-back, the total return (TR) swap combined with the sale of the reference asset is also very pop u lar in some coun tries, and the eco nom ics of the deal is equal to a clas sic repo.

Like most swaps, a TR swap does not involve the physical transfer of the underlying asset, only the netting of the positions is done at the end of the deal. With a TR swap, the risk of re val u a tion of the reference bond is transferred with the accrued interest to the counterparty in exchange for the safe fixed interest. The transaction is as fol lows: B owns bond C, but he does not want to take the credit and mar ket risk of the bond for a pe riod of time. There fore he agrees with A (who is will ing to take higher risk in or der to achieve higher return) that A will take over these risks and the yield of bond C without hav ing to make the out lay of cash re quired to pur chase the bond. So A ac cepts both the up side and the down side of bond C, while party B has no exposure to either. B receives the pre-determined LIBOR+spread in ter est rate. A is lucky if there is no sig nif i cant downside in yield C in the given period, and the return of C will be higher than the pre-determined in ter est he is obliged to pay for B.



The TR swap, when com bined with a sale of the reference asset, can be a sub stitute for a repotrans action. For ex ample, turn the situation around so that party A and not party B al ready owns bond C and wants to finance it. Party A could achieve this by selling bond C to party B and simultaneously entering into a TR swap agree ment with party B. At the maturity of the deal A has an option to repurchase the bond from B (or from somebody else). This synthetic transaction gives the same cash flows as a delivery repo and so the economics of the deals are the same, too. If we consider A as the seller and B as the buyer of a delivery repo, the TR swap produces the same result.



A TR swap has a number of ad van tages comparing to a repo:

- In some coun tries the costs of swap and sale trans actions are lower than repo's (including the costs of staff and pledging).
- It is more flex i ble than repo, since both par ties can im ple ment the synthetic transactions with more parties. The counterparts have the free dom to de cide whether they make a re purchase agreement for the underlying paper or they keep their po si tion ex ist ing at the end of the deal.
- Probably the most important reason why TR swaps are so popular is that many dealers' portfolios contain huge high-risk bond and repopositions. The collateral of repohave to be presented in the balance sheet be cause the repurchase transaction is an organic part of the deal. This means that even if the dealer repos out his high-risk papers for the reporting period, they will still negatively affect the results of the company. Companies with tight balance sheets need to find a solution to make their risky assets 'disappear' from their balance sheet during the reporting period. TR swap com bined with the sale of the ref er ence bond is a per fect tool for this - the asset temporally disappears from the balance sheet, but the risk re mains with the seller. The buyer needs to be mo ti vated not to make a repo with the same eco nom ics of deal as opposed to a TR swap. This can be achieved, for example, by higher yield. (It is of ten said that companies with a tight balance sheet buy the unexploited possibilities of companies with high reserves.) When repos are substituted with TR swaps and si mul ta neous bond sales, it is usual for the volume of repo deals to be much higher during the month and to decrease by the end of the month.

Lack of legal regulation and custom ary law can be an obstacle to the use or at least a factor decreasing the popularity of the above-mentioned transaction. Even ISDA (the association offering the widest range of documentation on credit derivatives) does not have in ternational stan dards for TR swaps.

1.2 Factors affecting repo rates

there are nu mer ous factors influencing the reporate Repo rates are generally lower than interbank lending rates. The simple reason for this is that repos can be considered as collateral-backed loans. In addition, there are numerous other factors influencing the reporate:

- Repo rates are based on comparable money market rates (deposits, CD) rather than on bond yields.
- Bond market conditions do affect repo rates, however. In a generally bearish bond market, when dealers are shorting bonds and need to borrow them, repo rates will tend to be lower. Con versely, in a bull mar ket for bonds, deal ers need to fi nance their po si tions, which tends to raise repo rates.
- The repo rates should be higher when the market in the particular collateral is less liquid, because the buyer can less easily real ise the value of the collateral in the event of default.
- A right of collateral substitution provides a convenience for the seller and an administrative burden and loss of flexibility for the buyer, for which the seller must be willing to pay The higher the number of substitutions allowed, the higher the reporate in gen eral.
- A hold-in-custody repo is more expensive than a delivery repo because of the greater credit risk to the buyer. The risk, and hence the rate, for a tri-party repo lies between the classic hold-in-custody and the delivery repo.
- Repo rate is most likely lowered when collateral is special. The lower the supply for the security, the lower the repo rate can be – some times sev eral per cent age points be low the normal cost of funds.

An open repo on which the repo rate is re-set daily, for ex am ple at an agreed spread com pared to over night in ter est rates, should be cheaper than a renewed overnight repo with the same maturity. Although the over night repo can be can be closed at a day's no tice and the collateral can be substituted, the costs incurred each day with overnight repos through transferring cash and securities are avoided.

1.3 Risks connected to repo

One of the main attractions of repo is its low risk. The use of collateral in volves a sig nif i cantly lower risk for these deals than nor mal loans, but there are still some fac tors that allow the possibility of default.

At first glance one might think that the counter parts of the repo are cov ered from all risks, be cause they send their cash and se curity transfer at the same time to each other, so they receive an asset equal in value to what they have transferred. This presumes that both parties ful fil their ob ligations both at the be gin ning and at the end of the deal. The risk that the counterpart will default is called **counterparty risk**. To elim i nate or at least dimin ish counterparty risk it is worthwhile agreeing with a clearing house, which assures DVP settlement.

In a delivery repo, the buyer also has to face the **issuer risk**, which is the risk that the issuer of the collateral will become bankrupt. If the issuer becomes bankrupt, and so the seller of the repo does not want to repurchase the collateral, the owner of the papers (the buyer) will possess a claim of low priority against the issuer company. In this case his claim can be unfulfilled. (With an equity repo the sit u ation can be even worse, be cause share hold ers stand at the very end of the line at wind ing up.) To re duce is suer risk, gov ernment papers are the most fre quently used as collateral in repos.

Even if the collateral is government bond, with longer term repos a sig nif i cant change in the value of the col lat eral can cause seri ous losses if there is no reg u lar mark ing to mar ket of the col lat eral. In those countries where in terest rate changes are frequent and relatively high, the value of fixed in come papers can change sig nif i cantly (mar ket risk). Potential loss in curred from the reval u ation of the collat eral is less with shorter term repos. Losses can be avoided by appropriate collateral management. The safest collateral management system for both par ties is daily mark ing to mar ket.

Mar ket risk can be in creased in cross-currency repos. Be cause of the different denomination of the cash and the collateral transferred, ex change rate changes also af fect the risk of the deal. This is called **exchange rate risk**. the risk that the coun ter part will default is called counterparty risk

the is suer of the collateral will be come bankrupt

asignificantchange in the value of the collat eral can cause se ri ous losses

mar ket risk can be in creased in cross-currency repos

2. | The origin of the repo

bankers'acceptance certificate(BA) The origin of the repo can be traced back to the early 20th century United States. It was built up as an instrument on the basis of the commercial credit instruments' market, bank guaranteed instruments, bankers' acceptance certificate (BA) and the government securities markets.

The BA is not re ally avail able out side the money mar ket. There are many sim i lar ities with bills of ex change or let ters of credit. It can be very ben e fi cial to use, if sec ondary mar ket yields are be low the credit rates of banks, but the size of the company would involve relatively high transaction costs of direct participation in the money market.

The BA can ap pear in sev eral forms, but the basis is al ways the same. The BA is used for assistance in commerce over a long time. It was wide spread in the USA in connections with the import of raw materials. The importer does not pay for the product immediately, but asks a bank to is sue a letter of credit in fa vour of the exporter. Receiving the letter of credit, the exporter dis counts it at his bank. The bank stamps "accepted" on the letter (hence it is called BA). The security could then start to oper ate as a different in strument; it was dis count able at the bank of is sue, it was mar ket able on the sec ond ary mar ket or it could be a valuable part of the bank's port fo lio for the longer run. At the begin ning of the century a huge BA sec ond ary mar ket grad u ally be gan to oper ate. There were banks with a desk special is ing in BAs and they oper ated with high exper tise and safety, so the mar ket soon be come very liquid. In many as pects the BAs that were available on the sec ond ary mar ket were in the same cat e gory (or close to it) as short maturity government securities. Typically those investors who bought T-Bills were the buy ers of the BAs.

Since an essen tial por tion of USA exports were backed by BAs, af ter the 1913 es tab lish ment of the FED it be came one of its most im por tant tasks (writ ten in the Fed eral Reserve Act) to as sist the devel op ment of the BA mar ket. The FED backed the foun dation of BA brokerage companies and several government bond dealers took part in the BA trade. At that time the FED expected big commercial banks to take on a large portion of responsibility for financing BA traders. Since this did not happen, the FED introduced a quotation available publicly for repurchasing agreements collateralised by BAs.

During the World War One the US central bank introduced several instruments with the aim of main taining the level of commercial bank reserves. In the beginning various sorts of credit instruments issued by banks were purchased. Then some problems emerged with these issues and the Fed started to intervenein the Treasury's

in 1923 the FED in tro d uced the in stru ment of short ma tu rity repo mar ket. Since the large amount of prompt pur chases were not ben eficial for trade, in 1923 the FED introduced the instrument of short maturity repo collateralised by government securities. The operations were tech ni cally processed by the New York FED.

These very early forms of repo agreements were quite simple; they had two special attributes. First, it was the responsibility of the central bank either to collect the interest payment and credit the account of the counterpart or to pass the interest coupon of the collateral credit in strument to the bank. Sec ond, these repo trans actions were so called "open repos", thus the Fed had the right to reverse them any time beforematurity.

However, it was not clear whether the FED had the right to make such trans actions with a bank not partic i pat ing in the system. A 1925 amendment of the Federal Reserve Act clarified the picture, entitling the FED to make credit con tracts with banks from out side the system.

American corporations used to place their tem porarily unnecessary liquidity mainly in T-Bills. But as repospread and became a more liquid instrument, corporations could tar get an even better or exactly matching maturity for their invested excess money. So, together with the FED, these corporations frequently assisted the repodeal ers to possess the necessary repocredit.

During the 1930s, because of the global financial crises (even though the FED and the corporations supplied sufficient repodeals) the demand for repo transactions sharply declined, since the fall of trade in volved the fall of the BA mar ket. At that time, bud get financing was not as weighty a question as it became during World War Two. Thus during that de cade repotrans actions grad u ally ceased.

Thereintroduction of reported by the FED after the Second World War was not designed to assist trade or back the domestic money market, but was done for mone tary policy reasons.

The monetary authority is able to balance the liquidity and the daily level of the reserves of the financial system by government bond out right sales and pur chases, or by repo and re verse repo. First the FED sold repo at fixed rates, then it changed to tenders. In the USA repo is the most ac cepted of the fine tuning in struments.

The repo has several advantages. It is not very optimal for monetary policy to change the maturity of a main in strument too frequently and using outright sales or purchases the operation could happen only with the maturity of the background security. It is not easy to deal with large turnover and big volumes of securities in an outright trans action.

Preparation for central bank intervention can be faster using repo. On the prompt government bond market the central bank interventions can disturb the habitual reactions of investors (even if the interventions are different indirection and the volume is large). "openrepos"

reintroductionafter the Sec ond World War was done for mon e tary pol icy reasons reverserepotransactions of the FED begun in 1960 Another advantage of the repo is the option of changing the collateral paper.

The first reverse repo transaction of the FED took place in 1960, when a huge excess liquid ity of the bank ing system was forecast.

The first re verse repo trans ac tion of the FED could be traced back to the fol low ing rea sons. The cen tral bank was aware that a forth com ing air line work ers' strike could cause trou ble in the USA. The strike could re sult in a sharp rise in ex cess re serves of banks, since cheques could not be de liv ered to their tar get des ti na tions and so the settle ment pro cess could not start. The FED was con sid er ing how to stir tem por arily the too high ex cess li quid ity of the mar ket. At the time the FED was cau tious about call ing the trans ac tion a "credit given to the cen tral bank", so "Matched Sale-Purchase transac tion" (MSP) was given as a name for the transaction. This was financially exactly the same as a re verse repo, but in the books it was kept as an out right sale.

The repo transactions among market participants started to spread in 1950. In the very be gin ning of the repo market his tory the portfolio manager of General Mo tors could not in vest in a match ing avail able maturity T-Bill the money allocated to finance the dividend payment. So he agreed with a discount house to purchase some government papers slightly below the market price and later (on a date agreed) sell them back. Since the transaction seemed to be beneficial for both parties, the repoin strument be came very popular in the USA.

3. | National repo markets

3.1 Great-Britain

3.1.1 The market repo

The Bank of England already ap plied repo twice a month from the beginning of the 1990s. This was well before market repo transactions were formalised (in 1994) and it became possible for official government bond dealers to make such trans actions.

The com plete liberalisation of the Gilt repo on the money market took place on 1 January 1996. Before that time securities lending was more widespread.

The British Gilt repo market were formalised on the basis of PSA/ISMA, and since the Gilt market had some special character istics it was supplemented by an attachment. The Bank of England also is sued an at tach ment, called "Code of Best Practice", and it regulated the market since the main rules were set out in this doc u ment.

Thesettlement of the Gilt repo is done by the Cen tral Gilt Of fice (CGO) backed by the electronic accounting system of the Bank of England. Because of the advantages of CGO membership with tri-party repo and international repo, some institutions obtained membership of the CGO, such as Cedel, Euroclear and the Bank of New York.

The Bank of England reduced the interest transfer on the Gilt from 37 to 7 days, precisely to assist the development of the repo mar ket. Es sen tially this means that the buyer of the Gilt re ceives the interest directly if he bought it at least seven days before the date of interest payment. However within the 7-day period the seller receives the interest, even if he does not pos sess the security. Thus in a repo transaction with an interest bearing collateral the parties have to be aware of the interest pay ment tim ing and if neces sary calculate the gap.

The interest rate of the special in the UK is usually 5–10bp lower than that of the gen eral repo.

In Great Britain the share of the special repo is higher (around 65% of the total), than the gen eral repo (35%).

complete liberalisation on 1 Jan u ary 1996

"Code of Best practice"

3.1.2 Central bank repo

The Bank of England used the repo as a monetary policy in strument before the liberalisation of the Gilt repo market. It fulfilled the very important task of addressing the need for liquidity on the money market during the ERM crisis in 1992.

new tech niques for smoothingliquidity

One of the 1997 re forms of the Bank of Eng land was the in troduction of new techniques for smoothing liquidity on the money mar ket. This was an im por tant step, since the BOE did not levy statu tory reserve on credit in stitutions with aver aging and so there was a need for an instrument to limit the fluctuations of the short-term market rates. The liberalised and dynamically developing repo became the primary instrument of liquidity management.

The one week liquidity forecast is important for liquidity management with the central bank. To be able to forecast the liquidity short age or the ex cess on the mar ket pre cisely the BOE re ceives information from the government administration about the transactions of the bud get in the near fu ture, from the different de part ments of the Bank about Gilt transactions, about the foreign exchange management, about the monetary aggregates and about the maturity dates and amounts of the monetary instruments. The BOE collects further important information from the market. Big banks notice if a client is about to send a weighty and unfore seen amount to the budget. In the forecast the BOE also takes into consideration weekends, national holidays and seasonal factors. The Bank publishes the forecast for the day at 09.45 through its electronic communication channels.

The central bank repo interest rates are fixed, but can be changed by the decision of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). The repo is sold on fixed interest rate tenders with a quantity limit. There are at least two repo ten ders a day; the ten der call con tains the amount offered, the fixed in terest rate and the maturity.

Generally *a*t the first daily auction 70% of the daily liquidity shortage is offered, and at the second the remaining 30%. It is also pos si ble for banks to run into neg a tive bal ance with the BOE dur ing the day, but they have to close with positive balance. Sometimes there are banks not able to fulfil the requirement of the positive end-day balance, because they could not allocate the adequate amount. This can be traced back to two different reasons: the bank mis matched the in-and-outflow or the BOE daily fore cast of li quid ity short age proved too small. If after the daily nor mal auctions a li quidity shortage remains on the market an extra auction can be made with a limited number of counterparties. If shortage remained because of a mis taken fore cast, and it turns out till the call for the ex tra auction the BOE does not apply higher rates (if it turns out later, banks assume the bur den of the higher in ter est rate). The "nor mal" repo share from the open mar ket ac tiv i ties of the BOE is about 71%, outright sales and pur chases take 23% and the ex tra auc tion repo has a 7% stake.

3.2 Germany

3.2.1 Market repo


Until 1997 the German repo marketprimarily operated in London. The main rea son be hind this was that the Bundesbank required a 2% minimum reserve requirement without remuneration on every kind of deposit placed by clients with credit institutions. So it seemed better for German banks to trade repo in London. This resulted in a larger German security based derivatives market in London than in the German do mestic market.

At this time – when London was the leading derivatives trade centre for German in struments – the traditionally large market of securities lending was spread, since it was not considered to be deposit. At that time the central bank repo was already applied and buy-and-sell-back was also available on the market. Market partic ipants using these instruments were motivated more by access to some special security, than by the need to cover liquidity shortages orreduceexcess liquidity.

The Bundesbank perceived the problem and made a survey about the probability of loopholes appearing in statutory reserve regulations should an exception be made for the repo transactions. The an a lysts said in the sur vey that in Ger many the trans action costs of the repo were quite high and thus only large volume (wholesale) contracts could be profitable, and that the majority of banks had such large amount contracts. It presumed a low probability of loopholes ap pear ing (which could hap pen if bank de pos i tors placed their cash in the form of repo in stead of de posit). In De cem ber 1996, taking its sur vey into con sid er ation, the Bundesbank de cided to ex empt from statutory reservere quire ment repo trans actions with collateral quoted on the stock exchange and with maturity shorter than one year. The collateral cannot be the is sue of a bank.

Af ter the ex emp tion came into force on 1 Jan u ary 1997 many credit institutions moved their derivatives trade back to Germany. Ac cord ing to a Bundesbank sur vey, in March 1996 the to tal stock of repo trans ac tions of the banks was DEM 8 bil lion; soon af ter the exemption it rose to DEM 14.4 billion; in December 1997 to DEM 48.3 bil lion and in Jan u ary 1998 to DEM 63 bil lion. The Bundesbank ex pects that the real amounts could be even higher. the Ger man repo mar ketpri mar ily oper ated in Lon don

the trans ac tion costs of the repo were quite high and thus only large vol ume contracts could be prof it able



The total volume of business repo contracts and the number of banks involved – in Germany

Chart 1


3.2.2 Repo as an instrument of the Bundesbank

The Bundesbank applied repurchasing agreement to intervene in the money market for the first time in April 1973. Since at the time there was insufficient legal and technical infrastructure to accept bonds as collateral, bills-of-exchange were used as back ground paper.

An important modification took place in 1979, when the central budget ran into considerable deficit, involving for eign-exchange out flow. To ensure a satisfactory amount of central bank money for the banking system, the Bundesbank increased the discount limit and reduced the statutory reserve requirement. How ever, this seemed to be effective only to a limited extent; furthermore, the volume of bills-of-exchange on the market was very small. Thus (in May) the Bundesbank introduced a new activity, contracting repurchase agreements collateralised by bonds. These transactions were applied only oc casion ally in the begin ning.

regularrepotenders from 1985

The Bundesbank made a fundamental change in 1985, when it started to call for repo ten ders on a reg u lar ba sis. From 1985 to 1999 the Bundesbank had repo tender ev ery week for 14 days maturity.



The institutions under the regulation of statutory reserve require ment were entitled to partic i pate in the ten ders for repo. Set ting the con di tions of cen tral bank repo, the Bundesbank was con cerned the about number of counterparties being as high as possible. Thus there were around 3400 credit institutionsentitled to participate in the ten ders and 600–1000 of them were effective and reg u lar partic ipants, even though the primary Bund dealers were not allowed bid directly at the ten ders.

Ac cord ing to the Bundesbank Act the Bundesrat was the main de ci sion-making body de ter min ing the strat egy of the Bank and the main principles concerning the credit and open marketoperations. Defining the framework of repo operations activity and the major modifications to it was also the prerogative of the Bundesrat. This body had a reg u lar meet ing once every two weeks, so the frame work could not change be tween the two meet ings.

The announcement of a repo tender and the beginning of the process was the task of the Board of Directors of the Bundesbank. The Board sent a note to the Regional Banks about the start of the repo trans action process. It was very important for the Board to have sufficient room for manoeuvre whenever necessary on the money market, e.g. in the case of larger-than-normal foreign exchange inflow or outflow.

the collateral valuation is con nected with a "pool system" The function of the Bundesrat and the Board is divided by the practice of set ting the frame work and defining the exact conditions. The Bundesrat was responsible for deciding the type of repo, the dates of the auctions, the tar get amount to sell, ma turity and, in the case of fixed in terest rate ten ders, the in terest rate de sired.

Technically the partners of the market participantswere directly the regional central banks. This function in volved the task of informing banks, receiving bids, channelling them to the Board, debiting or crediting the accounts of the bank accounts, and further more pledg ing of the collateral of the repo.

The collateral valuation is connected with a so-called "pool system". This meant that each of the cli ents of the cen tral bank had to keep an operational safe custody account specifically for Lombard (collateral) purposes. The credit institutions could only ap ply for a Lombard loan if there was a sufficient amount on the account as collateral. (At the end of 1997 the total amount of the pool ac count was DEM 558 billion.)

The securities eligible for repo were bonds listed on the stock exchange or on a concentrated security market, and bills is sued by the federal government or a fund of it or the provincial governments. A bond issued by a credit institution that wants to submit it for collateral is an exception.

The Bundesbank applied repo on fixed interest rate tender or fixed quantity tender (with minimum interestrate defined) using either the Dutch or American auction method. In 1997 the Bundesbank organised 53 repo auctions each in the form of interest rate tender. At the end of 1997 the amount of repo outstandings of the Bundesbank had risen to DEM 170 billion.

3.3 France

3.3.1 Market repo

"Pen sion Livrée Agree ment" (PLA)

The world's second largest repo market (after the USA) is the French one. This notable rank is reached because of the large domestic repo market, since the European centre of international repo is London. The assistance of the Banque de France together with an appropriatelegal environmentlargely encouraged the development of the repo money market. The gen eral repo con tract, which fixed the framework of repo agreement, the so-called "Pension Livrée Agreement" (PLA) was the French equivalent of the British PSA/ISMA, and it also helped the development of the French domesticrepo market. Another important development for the repo in dus try was the es tab lish ment of a sys tem of mar ket makers (Spécialises en Pension de Valeurs du Trésor – 'SPVT'). This grouped the 12 most active government bond deal ers in the repo market.

The op tion repo (vente á réméré) is a wide spread in stru ment of the French repo market. Its most important attribute is that the forward leg of repo contains an op tional re pur chase fa cil ity, and not an obligation. Gen erally the shorter the maturity the big ger the turn over in France, and the share of O/N repo is relatively high.

The TMP (Taux Moyen Pondéré) index was used ear lier in the French repo mar ket as a bench mark for pric ing repo, the in dex being the weighted average of the O/N interest rates. There were repos with fixed maturity indexed directly to the TMP plus a spread. Thus the repo rate came to light only aftermaturity. However the Banque de France, establishing the system of market makers and obliging them to quote two-way prices for different maturities from T/N to 3 months, encouraged the development of the fixed term repo and reduced the ap peal of the vari able rate repos.

3.3.2 Central bank repo

The bench mark in ter est rate of the Banque de France was the repo rate before integration into the EMU. There were two auctions a week with one week maturity. The interest rate move ment unit was 5bps. Before the euro was introduced the repo rate was gradually reduced from 4.45% (beginning of 1996) to 3.10% (end of 1997). The typ i cal amount sold at auctions was be tween FRF 31 billion and FRF 62 billion.

3.4 Switzerland

The Swiss repo mar ket has a very short his tory. The in tro duc tion of repos was ini ti ated by the Na tional Bank of Swit zer land (NBS) with its first repo deal on 20 April 1998. The new in stru ment made it possible for the NBS to widen the spec trum of its counter parts and to directly re fi nance small and me dium sized banks. In or der to achieve this lat ter goal, NBS set very low repo lim its: the least unit of a repo deal was es tab lished at 1 mil lion Swiss francs.

The volume of central bank repos then increased significantly, reaching the usual 8–12 billion Swiss francs volume of recent times

the op tion repo is a wide spread in stru ment

the Swiss repo market has a very short history the NBS cur rently uses repos only for expandingliquidity already in the first few weeks. The BNS intends to foster the significance of this instrument in the future.

Central bank repos are sold either at auctions or in the form of customised agree ments. Auc tions are not held every day, only when monetary conditions make it necessary. The NBS currently uses repos only for expanding liquidity. At the auctions, which start at 9 am, banks can submit their offers on the amount according to the pre-set interest rate and maturity. After the banks have submitted their of fers, the NBS de cides whether to fully or partly ac cept them, or reject them all. The results of the auctions are not published, for the NBS does not consider repo interest rates as its main interest rates, due to the currently underdeveloped Swiss repo market.

During the day, the NBS has the free dom to agree with its counterparts in unique repo deals with any kind of maturity and price. These unique and customised repos are undertaken also only for monetarypolicypurposes.

The NBS takes securities as collateral for repos only if they meet the following requirements:

1. Denomination and coupon yields only in Swiss francs.

2. Securities are traded on the stock market or on a significant market; set the ment through SEGA or INTERSETTLE.

3. Only issues exceeding CHF 100 million are ac cepted in order to as sure sufficient liquidity.

- 4. Collaterals can only be debt in struments.
- 5. Is suer of debt in strument can be:
- state,
- cantons,
- other debt ors guar an teed by the above men tioned,
- Swiss towns,
- Swiss cen tral of fice of mort gage bonds,
- for eign states (with ap pro pri ate S&P or Moody's rating) or institutions guaranteed by these,
- for eign banks (by rat ing).

Repos are traded through the electronic trading system of the stock exchange. Electronic trading has two components: the off-market and the on-market systems.

In the off-market sys tem, the bank wish ing to make a repo asks for other banks' of fers, and chooses amongst them (or rejects them). The on-market system is a standardised repo trading framework with given maturities and contract sizes. The system receives the banks' of fers and matches sup ply and de mand.

The repo set tle ment system de vel oped by the Swiss cen tral de pos i tory and clear ing house (SEGA) is one of the most so phis ti cated set tle ment systems of the world, and is unique in the sense that af ter the reali sa tion of the deal there is no need for any kind of man ual in-


one of the most sophisticated settlement sys tems of the world tervention. The system automatically chooses the most adequate collateral amongst the papers deposited in advance, makes daily mark ing to market, man ages substitutions, etc. Since August 1998, the SEGA settlement system has had a facility for the settlement of intra-day repos, which allows dealers to gain liquidity for only a few hours us ing repos.

3.5 The United States of America

3.5.1 Market repo

Since the roots of the repo were in the USA and this repo market is backed by the larg est gov ern ment bond mar ket on earth, no won der that the most developed, largest and most liquid repo market has evolved in the USA. The repo collateralised by US T-bonds is in overwhelmingmajorityon the mar ket, but there is also a very liquid market for other pa per collateralised (e.g. junk bond or mort gage) repo. The domestic market developed on the traditional form of repo, but be cause of the ad van tages of the set tle ment, tri-party repo also spread wildly. The most typ i cal is the o/n ma turity, with set tlement oc cur ring on the same (T) day.

the USA repo mar ket is backed by the larg est gov ernment bond mar ket



OCCASIONAL PAPERS

The FED promoted the development of the repomar ket with a mea sure that charged the banks for their intra-day neg a tive bal ance at a rate of 1bp per hour. This was necessary because a number of traders repaid the maturing market repo in the morning and balanced the cur rent ac count with a new repo con tract only at the end of the day. This measure of the FED encouraged the development of the tri-party repo and the open repo, because these forms have a smaller prob a bil ity of en cour ag ing a fall into intra-day neg a tive balance, since calling back a collateral is not as easy as permanently renewing it.

3.5.2 Central bank repo

the New York FED is responsibleforthe central bank's open marketoperations The New York FED is responsible for the central bank's open market op er a tions in the United States. The central bank repo and reverse repobelong to these operations.

The FED exercises influence over the liquidity of the banking system using US government bond transactions. There are a number instruments for this purpose and they can be grouped, as they are for prompt or temporary interventions. The prompt government bond sales and pur chases are among the most im por tant tools.

As a tem porary (for ward) trans action, the FED calls for repo or reverse repo (Matched Sale-Purchase Agreement, MSP) tenders from government bond dealers. The maturity of the central bank repo is be tween 1 and 15 days.

							Table 1	
Types of central bank repo								
Num ber of ten ders								
By tenders	Fixed maturity	Open repo	O/N repo	Foreign origin repo	Fixed reverse	O/N reverse repo	Total	
1994	44	22	26	54	0	5	151	
1995	43	17	25	43	8	9	145	
							USDbillion	
By tenders	Fixed maturity	Open repo	O/N repo	Foreign origin repo	Fixed reverse	O/N reverse repo	Total	
1994	175	82	105	113	0	13	488	
1995	168	81	120	87	27	21	504	

NATIONAL BANK OF HUNGARY

Applying fixed maturity reporte FED makes reportans actions with a discreet, maximum 15 days maturity. The open report fers the possibility of making the transaction "matured" before the original maturity.

The foreign origin repo is a form of FED transaction coming from the purchases (and keeping for a period) of US government bonds of foreign central banks from the FED as partners, and thus some liquidity could get into or leave the system. As these transactions oc curs on a daily basis in both edges, its effect is basi cally neutral. Some times there is a greater de viation from the op timal level on either of the edges, thus the FED uses the foreign originated repo in the domestic market to correct the im bal ance.

3.6 Japan

3.6.1 Market repo

Development of the Jap a nese repo was largely dis cour aged by regulations concerning trans action tax on do mestic government securi ties. This means that the seller have to pay tax on each sale transaction.

The large volume market participants over came the difficulties by moving their trade activities to off-shore environments, where reg is tration of the trade was not required. Set the ment of trans actions outside the stock exchange can be only on the 5th, 10th, 15th, 20th, 25th and 30th of the given month, and this also reduces the possible occasions for reposet the ment.

To avoid the tax payment, securities lending spread without collateral, but for a charge. This is called *taishaku*. In this case there is no security sold, thus there is no reason to impose a tax on transfer.

There is also room for the buy-and-sell-back (*gensaki*), but this is motivated mainly by financing need and not by the need to possess a kind of paper (not special, but general collareralisation is typical). Since the *gensaki* comes under the transaction tax requirement, the financing costs are high.

In 1996 a reform of the Jap a nese money mar ket was init i ated, and the repo market was also concerned. The modifications were proposed by the Bank of Japan. The new regulations made it possible to transfer a bond with out a change of own er ship. On this basis the genkin tampo tsuki taishakutrans action developed. the seller have to pay tax on each sale transaction

Table 2 Attributes of the instruments on the Japanese repo market							
Yen repo market	Gensaki	Taishaku	Genkin tampo tsuki taishaku				
Legalrelation	Sale and pur chase	Lending	Lending				
Collateral	Cash	Noth ing (or bonds)	Cash				
Trans fer fax	Yes	No	No				
Financecost	Very high (since the tax)	No financing needs	Reasonable				
Motivation	Financing	Cover ing the sale	Covering the sale or the financing				
Source : Nomura Internati	onal						

3.6.2 Central bank repo

The Bank of Japan applied *gensaki* primarily for liquidity management or fine tuning purposes. This in strument was in use un til the introduction of the new regulations, when the central bank started to apply the *genkin tampo tsuki taishaku* as a more flexible instrument.

3.7 EMU

repos have spe cial importanceamong themonetarypolicy instruments of the ESCB Repos have special importance among the monetary policy in struments of the ESCB (European System of Central Banks). One of the most important tools of the ESCB in volves open market oper ations, which basically consist of repurchase agreements and collateralised loans (these are equal to hold-in-custody repos).

The four main rea sons be hind ESCB repos are:

- 1. regularliquidity-providing;
- 2. longer-term liquidity-providing;
- 3. fine-tuning operations; and
- 4. structural operations.

The first two aims are executed only on the basis of repo tenders and the latter two are both on the basis of tenders and outright sales. The maturity and frequency of the tenders in the four cases might be different.

All ESCB credit operations have to be based on adequate collat eral. The ESCB ac cepts a wide range of as sets under lying its op erations. A distinction is made between two categories of eligible assets: "Tier one" and "Tier two". Tier one consists of marketabledebt

two cat e go ries of el igi ble as sets: "Tier one" and "Tier-two"

NATIONAL BANK OF HUNGARY

instrumentsfulfilling uniform Euroarea-wideeligibility criteria specified by the ECB. Tier two consists of additional assets, marketable and non-marketable, which are of particularim portance for national financial markets and bank ing systems, and for which eligibility criteria are established by the national central banks, subject to the ECB.

Debt in struments are subject to specific initial margins and valu a tion hair cuts established by ECB as a tool of risk control. Na tional central banks may require additional margining and establish partner limits, etc. on Tier two papers.

4. | Repo market in Hungary

Hungarian repo markets are less developed than those in western Europe and in the US. In the following chapters we discuss the domestic repo markets, both from the point of view of central bank repos and repos of other market participants (repos of the business sector). These two segments of the repo markets show different char acteristics in many ways.

4.1 Regulatory framework¹

the no tion of re purchase agree ment is not de fined by ei ther the Civil Code or by Act

from a civil law approach an atyp i cal con tract

ac cord ing to the system of the Se curi ties Act are con sid ered as futuressecuri ties contracts The no tion of re pur chase agree ment as a sort of securi ties trans action – or in other words, securities sales agreement with repur chase obligation – is not defined by either the Civil Code or by Act CXII of 1997 on Floatation of Securities, In vest ment Services and the Stock Exchange (hereinafter: the **Securities Act**).

From a civil law approach, repurchase agreement is an atypical con tract where counterparties agree to trans fer the own er ship of securities and, at the same time, they agree on the repurchase price as well as every other condition of the sale. In terms of contractual rights and du ties of the parties, one may distinguish be tween several types of re pur chase agree ments. There are basi cally two types of repurchase agree ments ap plied in do mes tic practice: in case of de livery re pur chase, the trans action is de fined as a sale and re pur chase, whereas with a hold-in-custody re pur chase agree ment se curities are considered only as collateral se curing the deal.

According to the system of the Securities Act, repurchase agreements are considered as futures securities contracts (Section 5 b.), even though the act does not provide a definitioneitherabout securities forward agreements or about repurchase agreements and reverse repurchase agreements.

In the effective legal norms and regulations, repurchase agreements are defined in secondary legislation (mainly in accounting rules), but not in a uniform way.

¹ The chap ter is writ ten with the as sis tance of Regulatory Debt.

GovernmentDecree No. 18/1997 (II. 4.) on the spe cific re porting and accountingobligations of the **National Bank of Hungary** defines re pur chase agree ment in Section 2 as follows: Under the scope of this decree (that is, with respect to the accounting rules concerning the NBH)

- any agree ment is con sid ered as re pur chase agree ment provided that, upon con clud ing the agree ment, one party transfers the own er ship of, or posses sion of, the securities providing a full state ment of guar an tees and liabilities for a certified amount of consideration, and undertakes to repurchase or retake them in possession at an agreed time and under specified conditions;
- any repurchase agreement is considered as a hold-incustody repurchase agreement provided that the securities are held in cus tody as collateral on the seller's ac count at the ven dor's dis posal during the entire time of the agreement;
- any repurchase agreement is considered as delivery repurchase agreement provided that the securities are, upon financial settlement, transferred from the seller's account to the ven dor's ac count and the latter may, during the entire time of the agreement, dispose of the securities.

Government Decree No. 198/1996 (XII. 22.) on the spe cific reporting and accountingobligations of **credit institutions** defines repurchase agreements with respect to credit in stitutions, as a spe cific type of borrowing against security as follows:

Borrowing against security (or, in the usage of the Decree, "pen sion place ment" or "place ment agree ment", which is the Hungarian ap pli cation of an older French ex pres sion) means that a credit institution, financial undertaking or client (the lender) transfers assets held in its books (e.g. a bill of exchange, debts or securities) to another credit institution, financial undertaking or client (the borrower) under an agreement to the effect that the same as sets should be retransfered to the lender at a later point at an agreed price (see below a. and b.):

a) a genuine placement agreement is an agreement whereby the bor rower under takes to re transfer the as sets either at a specified time or at a time to be specified by him,

b) a not-genuine placement agreement is an agreement whereby the borrower is entitled to retransfer the assets at sales price (or against a consideration agreed in ad vance) at a specified time or at a time to be specified by him, and the borrower undertakes to take them back. An agreement whereby lender and borrower agree to retransfer and retake the assets at the sales price or at an agreed price upon fulfilthe specific reporting and accounting obli ga tions of the Na tional Bank of Hungary defines repurchase agree ment

a spe cific type of borrow ing against security ment of a spec i fied con di tion may also be con sid ered to be a not-genuine place ment agree ment.

in vestmentfirms does not have any specificac counting provision with respect to re pur chase agreements **GovernmentDecree** No. 197/1996 (XII. 22.) on the spe cific reporting and accounting obligations of **investment firms** does not contain any specific provision with respect to repurchase agreements, nei ther does it refer to any of the above le gal norms.

4.1.1 Problems arising from the lack of sufficient regulation of repurchase agreements

Since repurchase agreements are not uniformly regulated, and there is no generally accepted definition of the notion, this type of transaction is highly susceptible to legal evasion and thus the undermining of the efficiency of legal regulation.

With respect to foreign exchange law, assessment of the legal nature of repurchase agreements varies. According to one opinion, repurchase agreements fall into the category of negotiable investment instrument as defined in Sub-section 3. 28/b. of Act XCV of 1995 on for eign ex change, since

- it is a certificate is sued in respect of a right or liability which is not considered as security, never the less
- it cer ti fies the re ceipt of an equity or a debt in strument, and
- it pro vides full right of dis posal un til ma tu rity.

The Act on Foreign Exchange does not consider short term capital movements as liberalised, there fore it stip u lates that "a resident may trans fer to a non-resident any

- bond or other debt instrument or money market instrument which was is sued with a maturity of less than 365 days,
- transferable instruments issued by a resident" (Sub-sections 35.5. a–b) of the Foreign ExchangeAct).²

The category of transferable instruments includes, among others:

- a certificate is sued in respect of money claims,
- acertificatenotqualifyingassecurity, certifyingthereceiptof a debt instrument or security, or indirectly allowing right of disposal of such in struments,
- futures agreements effected with money claims, exchange rate and interest risk swap agreements or any other derivative agreement, regard less of whether or not a doc u ment has been issued in respect thereof (Sub-sections 3. 28. b-e) of the Foreign Exchange Act).

² The list is not com plete, it only con tains the pro vi sions bear ing rel e vance with re spect to this paper.

Under the Foreign Exchange Act, repurchase agreements fall under different consideration if one regards them as two separate prompt sale agreements.

For in this case the object of these agreements is regarded as sale of a debt instrument with maturity exceeding 365 days and, consequently, these agreements do not require any permit. (Thus, such agreements are not legally considered as repurchase agreements, therefore the repurchase agreement implies high risk, because it is not backed with collateral.)

Should we consider repurchase agreement as the combination of a prompt sale of securities and a for ward agreement, we arrive at yet another conclusion under the For eign Ex change Act, and in this case, a permit is required not only for the joint agreement but also separately for the for ward part.

If we consider repur chase agree ment as a credit agree ment, its status under foreign exchange law will be again different, since repurchase or other agreements must comply with the definition of credit as set forth in the Foreign Exchange Act (Sub-section 3.30.d).

Ac cord ing to Sub-section 3.30.d of the For eign Ex change Act, credit shall mean:

a) money loan,

b) deferred payment (commercial credit, credit against goods, supplier's credit),

c) advance and instal ment payment,

d) re pur chase agree ment not de fined in the above sub-sections where re pur chase is effected at a price (value) higher than the orig inal sales price (value); in de ter min ing whether or not the re pur chase price is higher than the original price, all amounts paid with respect to repurchase shall be taken into consideration.

Legal uncertainty with respect to repurchase agreements is further in creased by the fact that these agreements may be considered as credit agreements from the viewpoint of eco nom ics. Some of the quoted legal norms and regulations confirm such qualification as credit agreements, for example the regulation on placement ("pension") agreements in the Government Decree on the ac count ing obligations of credit institutions. The Government Decree on the accounting obligations of the NBH explicitly uses the expression "granting credit" with respect to hold-in-custody repurchase agreements.

Yet (with some limitations on certain own er ship rights), more exactly the combination of a prompt and a for ward sales agreement.

the com bination of a prompt sale of se curities...

...or a credit agreement

these agree ments might better be consid ered as credit agreements...

...the le gal form is securitysalesagreement Investmentfunds make use of the inconsistencies of legal regulation in or der to avoid therestrictions imposed upon them with a view to re duce risk and pro tect their portfolio Sub-sections 9.3 and 9.4 of Act LXIII of 1991 on investment funds prohibit fund managers from pledging the capital of the fund under their management or from using it as collateral in any other way, as well as from granting credit (lending) from the investment fund's own funds (with the exception of purchasing debt instruments). Sub-section 36.4 stipulates that the deposit holder may not give the securities forming part of the portfolio of the investment fund into the posses sion of any body during the entire time of de posit, not even tem porarily (with the exception of KELER, the Central Securities Clearing House).

All the above provisions, especially those aiming to avoid unnecessary risking of the own funds of the investment fund (S. 9.3. and 9.4.) may be circumvented by entering into repurchase agreements.

Thisdemonstrates the high level of uncertainty concerning legal regulation on repurchase agreements such that several articles have been published recently by practising law yers drawing the conclusion that it might well be possible that a court would de clare the validity of repurchase agreements as nullified, based on general principles of civil law, since the sale of securities with repurchase obligation is an agreement hiding a credit agreement, thus it does not in deed exist, does not have any legal valid ity, and one should in stead take into consideration the agreement hidden by the repurchase agreement, that is the credit agreement. The widespread nature of this opinion shows that do mes tic law firms as well as the legal opinions provided by them to for eign in vestors stand on an uncertain basis, and it is impossible to predict what ruling an independent court would arrive at, and what kind of expertise it could be based on. Hence is necessary to create unambiguous regulation with respect to foreign investments, especially if we intend to impose sanctions on those violating the rules.

4.1.2 Regulation on repurchase agreement in the EC Directive on capital adequacy

Council Directive 93/6/EEC of 15 March 1993 on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions contains the followingdefinitiononrepurchaseagreements:

"Article 2.17. repurchase agreement and reverse repurchase agreement shall mean any agreement in which an institution or its counterparty transfers securities or guaranteed rights relating to title to securities where that guar an tee is is sued by a re cog nised ex change which holds the rights to the securities, and the agreement does not allow an institution to transfer or pledge a particular security to more than one counterparty at one time, subject to a com mit ment to re pur-

definition on repurchase agree ments of the FC... chase them (or substituted securities of the same description) at a specified price on a future date specified by the transferor, being a *repurchase agreement* for the institution selling the securities and a *reversere purchase agreement* for the institution buying them.

"A reverse repurchase agreement shall be considered an interprofessional agree ment when the counterparty is subject to prudential coordination at Com munity level or is a Zone A credit in stitution as defined in Directive 89/647/EEC or is a recognised third country in vest ment firm, or when the agree ment is concluded with a clear ing house or ex change.

18. Se curi ties lend ing and se curi ties bor rowing shall mean any transaction in which an institution or its counterparty transfers se curi ties against ap propriate collateral subject to a commit ment that the borrower will return equivalent securities at some future date or when requested to do so by the transferor, being securities lending for the institution transferring the securities and securi ties borrowing for the institution to which they are transferred.

"Securities borrowing shall be considered an interprofessional trans action when the counterparty is subject to prudential coord ination at Community level or is a Zone A credit in stitution as defined in Directive 89/647/EEC or is a recognised third country investment firm or when the agree ment is concluded with a clear ing house or exchange."

It should be noted that EC regulation on capital adequacy will be extended to com modities and gold trans actions as of June 2000, and the definition of repurchase agree ments will also be extended to commodities transactions.

4.2 Questions of accounting

In international comparison several countries do not specify special rules for repo accounting. However, according to the international accounting principles, all the transactions must be booked as their real eco nomic es sence and not as their for mal in stru ments show. In repo accounting this means that they can appear as a prompt sale and a forward purchase, but if they are a collateralised loan in the economic sense, then they should be booked as a collateralised loan.

The EU Bank Accounting Di rec tives states that if the buyer is not a holder of the collateral security (3-party repo, pledged repo) un der the term of the repo, the prin ci ples are these:

For the buyer :

 The collateral security is not integrated into the balance sheet. ... and on the se cu rities lend ing and se curities borrowing

all the trans actions must be booked as their real eco nomic essence

EUBank Accounting Directive

 The cash amount paid for the security is booked as any other loan asset. Possibly with a heading showing that it is originated from repo trans action.

For the seller:

- The security sold remains a part of the seller's bal ance sheet, but it must be kept in a special ac count with a notification that it is underrepotrans action.
- The cash received for the collateral is booked on the liability side, as in the case of receiving a loan. The possibility is also given for the seller to separate an account for loans received from the money market and loans received from repo.

Some special cases of repo ac counting

One of the most important points of the PSA/ISMA agreement concerns repo net ting. When two repo coun ter parts have a num ber of repo and reverse repo contracts and they cannot deliver either the security or the cash, the opposite positions can be netted. Accounting cannot always handle this financially logical solution. As there are different maturities and different collaterals, the principle of gross settlement is frequently used in such cases. However in some countries repo net ting of op po site po si tions is also pos si ble on bal ance sheet (it is also fea si ble in GMRA).

Mainly in the USA the repo has a type, where the buyer gives back not the orig i nal sort of se curi ties, but ones which have the same value as the orig i nals. In this case the ac count ing is ba si cally the same as with repo net ting. In this case the im por tant thing is the same, whether it is a loan or a security sale and repurchase.

in Hun gary, due to theunderdeveloped legalenvironmentof repo there is someconfusion In Hungary, due to the underdeveloped legal environment of repo from the ac count ing point of view, there is some con fu sion. Neither the Act on Accountancy nor even the Act on Securities mentions repo transactions. Thus, gen er ally, it is up to the par ties to decide whether they book it as a prompt sale and a forward purchase (below the balance sheet), or as lending. Both approaches differ from the ba sic eco nomic mean ing of repo.

There is no unambiguous and general rule for repo accounting in any other act. Thus there have been a number of accounting solutions in practice. Sometimes security lending, sometimes two sale-purchase transactions in different time and sometimes prompt sale and for ward re pur chase is booked.

Whether the repo is booked as security lending, the seller does not clear the collateral item from the bal ance sheet, but on the liability side it receives loan (liability) that in ducts cash as as set. Repobetween banks (or credit institutions) and non-banks is under the statutory reserve requirement levied on banks if booked as security lending, be cause there is a rise in the liability side of the bank (from the non-banking sector). This regulation discourages the potential

the repo can be booked as security lending repo counterparties to book their agreements (financially equal to repo) as a security lend ing sort of repo.

Booking repo as security lending between two bank counterparts is not dis advanta geous for either of the parties, since these are interbank transactions and so the compulsory reserve does not apply to them. Thus there is no reason for not booking repo between banks as security lending short of repo, as opposed to, for example, two prompt transactions (sometimes this is not clearly understood by credit institutions).

The other practice of repo accounting is the buy-and-sell-back sort of book ing, when the gov ern ment bond is sold and it re duces the size of the bal ance sheet. The o retically, after the first leg of the transaction the second leg should be booked as a futureresponsibility below the balance sheet. A less pru den tial bank could en gage in un lawful practice when a finan cially repo trans action with a maturity of less then one year is realised with a non-resident. Such a bank faces se rious sanctions if the forex activity supervisors of the central bank can find the for ward leg of the trans action in the books. Thus it can hap pen that the for ward leg of the repo trans action is miss ing in the books until maturity, and it is booked only at the date of maturity as a prompt purchase. Thus the forward leg of the repo could be found only with the certificate of the trans action and called "drawer con tract", since it cannot be found in the books, only in the drawers.

The prac tice of book ing repo as two out right sales/pur chases has a number of disad van tages for the counterparties.

- The profit effect of the repo ap pears not in the ad e quate profit centre of the com pany.
- It can re sult in some con fu sion even loss in the pro cess of stock valuation.
- It can divert the market yield averages.
- It also can distort the statistics.

In the following four chapters (4.2.1 to 4.2.4) we examine the problems (indicated above) if a financially reportant transaction is booked as a prompt sale and later as a prompt resale.

4.2.1 Effect of rearranging the gain in time and among profit centres

Book ing the repo as a prompt sale (clear ing from the bal ance sheet) and later as a prompt re pur chase can di vert the date of the gain appearance and can be confusing for the profit-and-loss statement of the profit cen tres.

can be con fusing for the profit-and-loss state ment of the profit centres

the other prac tice of repo ac count ing is the buy-and-sellback sort of book ing

dis ad van tages of BSB ac count ing for the counterparties The seller of the paper has to sell the collateral security at the market price reduced by the haircut and the interest, thus loss appears in the books. But at the repurchase leg of the transaction, the seller buys it back at a price reduced by the haircut, and this is booked as a prompt sale on that price.

Table 3 Accounting procedure of the repo booked as prompt sale-purchase			
	Seller of the paper	Buyer of the paper	
Beforethetransaction	Re ceives the pa per at mar ket price. Book ing it at this price.		
At the prompt leg of the trans- action	Sells the se cu ri ties at a price re- duced by hair cut and in ter est. Books the loss.	Buys the se cu ri ties at a cheaper than mar ket price and places to the books at it.	
At the for ward leg booked also as prompt	Buys back the se curi ties at a I ower than mar ket price (by the hair cut) and books it at this price as a new ac qui si tion. Com paring to the mar ket price ac qui si tions the hair cut is a loss un til the pa- pers are sold.	Sells the pa pers cheaper then the mar ket, but higher (by the in ter est), then the price of ac- qui si tion. The inter est gain ap- pears in the securi ties trade line and not on the credit fi nance line.	
Afterthetransaction	Sells the se cu ri ties at mar ket price and books the hair cut as a gain.		
The re sult con cern ing the profit and loss of the trans ac tion	The "eco nom i cally" credit in ter- est cost re duces the profit of the se curi ties trade. If the ac count- i ng day is dur ing the ma tu rity of the trans ac tion, the over all profitis smaller. It is also smaller af ter the trans ac tion, but be fore the out right sale of the pa per.	The in ter est re ceived in creases the gains of the se cu rity trade in stead of the credit fi nanc ing.	

At the first repo sale, (in most cases) gov ern ment paper is sold much be low the mar ket price – the dis count fac tor be ing the interest and the haircut. Thus if taken in anticipation that there is no market price fluctuation of the paper during the maturity, then the seller bought the securities at a higher (market) price. The seller has to book loss at the first leg of the repo orig i nat ing from the gap be tween the ac qui si tion price and the repo sale. With the for ward leg (booked also as a prompt one) the se cu rities are re pur chased also not at the mar ket value, but at a price modi fied by the hair cut on the OTC mar ket. The seller is in a dis ad van tageous situation again, since he bought back the papers below the market price, but to reduce the accountancy loss he suffered at the first repo leg (and get back the price of the hair cut), he has to sell the paper on the market.

At the end of the whole transaction the seller in effect pays the interest for the "credit", which unfortunately appeared not on the credit costs line of the institution, but on the securities trade line of the profit-and-loss statement, so reducing the gains of a the securities trade section operating also as a profit centre. That is why the fixed in terest bear ing in struments division of the trea sury is not in terested in such transactions, when there is a need to satisfy financing requirements.

the trea sury is not inter ested in such BSB transactions

Ex am ple for the ac count ing of repo as two prompt sales and pur chases

Here is an example to present this sort of booking. The seller gives the buyer 100 unit value of gov ern ment bonds. Sup pose that the net value of the securities is fixed during the transaction. The 100 units must fit the amount of the credit, the ac crued in ter est of the trans ac tion and the margin. Assuming that for the whole maturity the interest is 8 units and the mar gin is 2 units, the buyer re ceives the pa pers for 90 units. At this point the ac coun tant places 10 units of loss with the seller, since the se curi ties pur chased for 100 units are sold for only 90.

When the seller buys back the col lat eral, he has to pay 98 units for the securities valued for 100 units in the money market. Thus the accountant can show a 2-unit gain, but only later, when the se cu ri ties are sold on the market for 100 units. This gain ap pears later, but again on the se cu ri ties trade profit line. The economic content of the transaction is closer to a credit. The difference between the two prices – in this case 8 units – equals the charge of the credit (the in ter est). And the in ter est ap pears not in the ap pro pri ate line of the books.

In the case of the buyer the op po site hap pens. This case is more sim ple, since the ac qui si tion of the se curi ties hap pens at the first leg of the repo at ac qui si tion price. At the for ward leg the gain ap pears im me di ately. From that point, the gain of the credit ap pears im me di ately in the right time and the hair cut is only a neu tral tran sit stock, but the gain raises the value of the se curi ties trade profit and not the credit fi nanc ing profit.

4.2.2 The anomalies of stock valuation

the prob lems with stock valuation Here is an example to show the problems with stock valuation. On Monday a brokerage firm buys 100 government bonds at 100% value. On Tuesday it pledges 100 to be released on Friday. On Wednes day it buys 100 ad di tional ones for 110%. And on Thurs day it sells 100. On Fri day the Tues day pledge is over.

The assumption is that the brokerage firm uses the "First out" method of stock valuation.

The question is whether the securities pledged as collateral are out of the stock (typ i cally for a buy-and-sell-back or a delivery repo they are out). If they are out, the securities bought at 100% and KELER accepted at 95% will be booked back at this value. If at the same time of the pledge, the securities are cleared from the stock, a 5% loss arises in the books, since the securities bought at 100% are booked back only at 95%, though financially there were no loss. To solve the problem the securities must be sold on the mar ket.

Thus it is not rec om mended that the pledge be a stock trans action like buy ing or sell ing a security, rather it requires a sep a ration of the pledged stock under the bal ance sheet or only a sep a ration in the analysis.

The sold securities also have some problems arising from the stock valuation. The sale of the 100 units is made by a "first out" method from the 100% value purchased paper. In contrast the pledge used the same 100% value security. The ac countant can decide – by "first out" – that the sale used the 110% value securi ties, because the 100% value stock is under pledge, so it is impossible to move it.

Ac cord ing to the choice of the ac coun tant, the cost of the se curi ties sold can be 100% or 110%; the price is fixed, so it has an effect on the profit-and-loss state ment.

A uniform solution could be to apply "first out" theory as the pledged stock is al ways moving and formed from the remaining (not sold) part of the port folio. This is hardly feasible on the level of analysis, when the pledged securities are equipped and booked with a serial number.

4.2.3 The deterioration of market average yields

differ ent val ues from the mar ket price Among outright bond sales there are some repo transactions booked as prompt sale-purchase. To make a repo synthetically, the price gap be tween the two pur chases has to be equal to the in ter est. That is why the two legs of the transaction can present (some times largely) different values from the market price, depending on the maturity, since the buyer receives an under-valued collateral paper.

The hair cut is also built into both trans ac tion legs and is also a part of the se cu rity price. Com paring the two legs – un like the in terest pay ment – the hair cut is built into both, but to en sure the safety of the buyer the prices are shifted down from the mar ket val ues.

These art if i cial market values can induce higher average yields in a deep repo market if the transactions are accounted as prompt sales and purchases, and the whole yield-curve can be shifted towards higher yields in place of the real ones.

4.2.4 Statistical problems

Without the adequate regulation of repo and similar instruments problems can arise with aggregate bond statistics. How ever, in Hungary there is no influential effect of the repo statistics problems, since the OTC statistics show only a small gap be tween prices of the same security on the sec ond ary market, but there should be prep aration against the potential danger of this. Such mistakes can be found with the prices of bonds and their volume.

The secondary mar ket price of the repo collateral can divert from the mar ket price, as also the yield induced if booked as two prompt transactions and reported in the KELER OTC statistics (see previous section for de tails). One of the so lu tions could be if the size of the repo trans actions could be sep a rated from the bond sales and the repo in ter est and mar gin could be un cov ered. How ever, the main advantage of this accounting is that there is not much possibility of tell ing the differ ence be tween the real prompt sales and the legs of a synthetic repo. With out changing the reg u la tions there is no room to fil ter the false data.

The volume statistics can be distorted if the two parties of the repo use different accounting. Imagine that the seller clears the security from the books, but the buyer does not take it into the bal ance sheet, so the security "disappears" between the two institutions. In an opposite case – when both of the parties have the same security in their bal ance sheet – the security is du plicated.

The accounting of securities lending is also contradictory. If A lends B a security, then the security remains in the bal ance sheet of A, as he is the owner of the security. But B has a right to sell the paper to C, who will also be an owner. Following a boom in securities lending (un likely in the near fu ture), the num ber of securities on the secondary market could statistically be greatly multiplied. the sec ond ary mar ket price of the repo collateral candivert from the mar ket price, as also the yield in duce and reported in the KELER OTC statistics

the account ing of securities lending is alsocontradictory

4.3 Repo in the business sector

4.3.1 Obstacles to the development of repo markets

repos in the busi ness sec tor are much less trans par ent than central bank repos Repos in the busi ness sector are much less trans par ent than cen tral bank repos. According to the statistics, market participants in Hungary hardly do any repo deals with each other, buy/sell-backs are much more com mon. This is due to many rea sons, but mainly to the regulatory restrictions set by the National Bank.

the Act pro hib its foreign ers from un der tak ing any kind of fu tures or for ward deriv a tives with a ma tu rity of less than one year

there is still an ob stacle for for eign ers creat ingsynthetic repos this way The Currency Act of 1995 prohibits for eigners from under taking any kind of futures or for ward deriv a tives with a maturity of less than one year. Because repos are usually short term (less than one year) for ward deals, only do mestic in vestors can deal in them legally, which means that the potential repo volume is only a fragment of what it could be with liberalisation. Another hindrance to the developmentof repo mar kets is that repos are subject to com pul sory reserve re quire ment. This makes repos too expensive for banks; it is worthwhile to cre ate syn thetic repos by two si mul ta neous sale and pur chase agreements. If the two agreements are signed on the same date, the deal is a buy/sell-back, which is not a subject of reserve requirements, though the eco nom ics of the deal is the same as with repo.

Buy/sell-back provides a solution for banks (who are less prudent in this respect) to get round the compulsory reserve requirement, but since B/S is a for ward deal (if the term of the deal is lon ger than 8 days) there is still an obsta cle for for eign ers creat ing syn thetic repos this way. Changing the date of the forward leg agreement to the maturity date of the B/S makes it appear as if the B/S would be two independent spot purchases – coincidentally with the same amount and type of underlying instrument and with the reverse direction. Foreigners often use this kind of synthetic repo in Hungary, rather than depositing their money with the same conditions with a low-rated Hun gar ian bank, even if the trans action costs of a bank deposit would be lower.

An other way of "con verting" for ward deals to spot deals is to involve a third party (not clearing house) in the bilateral deals. In this case the sell and repurchase deals are carried out with two different counterparts, who offset their positionsafterwards. It is very hard to prove that these deals cover a syn thetic for ward agree ment. The disad van tage of this kind of trans ac tion is that it in volves a dou ble partner risk compared to a normal repo or buy/sell-back. Partner risk can be minimised through clearing houses, but this also increases the cost of the deal. It is important to note that it is very hard to draw the line between deals aim ing to get round the reg u la tions and deals car ried out for pure mar ket rea sons – hedged po si tions can look like B/S deals.

In ter bank credit lim its also hin der the de vel op ment of repo markets. This prob lem still ex ists, though deals are usu ally set tled by DVP – most of the banks do not take the (minimal) risk of default. This might also ex plain the fact that banks some times gain cash by ex pensive cen tral bank repos rather than by bor row ing (cheaper) from other banks. In ter bank credit lim its are set by the for eign head-offices of the banks, and domestic branches usually cannot influence the extent of these lim its. In the short run we can not ex pect prog ress in this re spect, because the recent uncertainty of international financial markets has a neg a tive effect on the tight ness of these lim its.

Interbank limits also mean that it is not cheaper for banks in Hungary to raise liquidity through repos than through (not pledged) interbank loans. This is because risk is not embodied in interest rates, but in the low lim its set for each other. Repos are usuallyconsidered within the framework of interbank limits. This is irrational, because the two transactions (repos and interbank loans) are very different in terms of risk.

An other fac tor that does not help to in crease the vol ume of repos is that banks of ten keep only as much gov ern ment paper in their portfolio as neces sary, so they often do not have sufficient paper to repo with. It is also a prob lem that when money mar ket li quid ity is not balanced, then most mar ket partic i pants ei ther suffer from ex cess li quidity or from lack of li quid ity, which means that the sup ply and de mand for repos is not appearing at the same time. Potential losses derived from the bookkeeping of repos and buy/sell-backs also make it less worthwhile to carry out such operations. The most frequently used bookkeeping is the FIFO based registration, which can cause (non-real) losses for the company undertaking repo transactions (*chap ter 4.2.2.*), while this never oc curs with in ter bank loans.

The relatively complicated set the ment procedure of reposis also a problem for dealers. Most banks' in ternal regulations require written contracts, and this in volves more ad min is tration for a repothan for a simple loan agreement. Administration could be highly reduced if banks put the rules of repos in their general conditions of operations (like the NBH), or if they refer to the relevant regulations of KELER.

Sum marising the above, syn thetic and special kinds of repo are much more com mon in Hun gary than clas sic repos. This can be explained above all by the strict reg u la tions. It is con ceiv able that if reserve requirements for repos were abandoned and foreigners al lowed to participate in the Hungarian repo market, the volume of synthetic repos and buy/sell-backs would decrease in favour of an in crease in the amount of clas sic repos – though the ex tent of pos sible in crease is not easy to es ti mate. Banks would have the pos si bil ity in ter bank credit limits also hin der the developmentofrepo markets

an other fac tor that does not help to increase the vol ume of repos

liber a tion now is not diserable from the point of view of the cen tral bank of offering repo facility instead of bank deposits for major clients. How ever, it is doubt ful that it would also be worth while to offer such a facility for minor clients because of the high transaction costs; they would basically continue this activity with only those few partners with whom they al ready repo. Can celling the reserve re quire ment on repos (while other liabilities remain subject to reserve re quire ment) would cause most of the banks' liabilities to be registered as repos. This would let banks avoid reserve re quire ments, which is ab so lutely not de sir able from the point of view of the cen tral bank.

If the income effect of the reserve requirement lessens, the banks' motivation get round the regulation will lose its importance. The income effect can lessen by decreasing the reserve rate or by increasing the remuneration on reserves. Holding back the costs of steril is ation (up to a rational level) has higher priority from the monetary policy point of view than developing money market in struments (e.g. repos), so increasing the level of remuner ation on reserves is not a real choice for the central bank in developing repomarkets. The gradual lowering of the reserve rate can be expected when the NBH can permanently implement high-end operations, and that will be possible after the end of the current steril is ation need. This would also cut off the income effect of the compulsory reserves and would lead to the develop ment of the Hungarian repomarket.

Pros and cons of exempting repos from reserve requirement

Pros for exempt ing repos from reserve requirements:

- Some banks get round the re serve re quire ments by hid ing large value deposit deals behind buy/sell-backs. Releasing repos as a subject of re-serve re quire ments would not only trans fer money to repos from de pos its, but also from out right sales and pur chases.

- The limited amount of government papers in banks' portfolios restricts the possibility of lowering the effective reserverate.

Be cause of the rel a tively high face value of gov ern ment se curi ties and because of the grow ing ad min is tra tion and trans ac tion costs, it would not be prof it able for banks to con vert low value de pos its to repos.

- The second leg of buy/sell-back agreements is poorly documented by banks. Ex empting repos from re serve re quire ment would al low banks to pro mote repo as a legal al ter na tive to de posits.

Cons of exempting repos from reserve requirements:

- Exempting repos from reserve requirements would probably make banks convert large value deposits to repos, thus evad ing the obligation of compulsory reserves

- De posits for merly reg is tered as buy/sell-backs could le gally be promoted as repos by banks, and this would probably cause the number of repos to grow

- Evading the reserve requirement could cause a decrease of effective reserve rate. The long-term goal of the NBH is to decrease the effective reserve rate by low ering the nom i nal rate of reserves when it is possible.

Allowing foreigners access to the short-term Hungarian forward mar ket would prob a bly make this mar ket seg ment more transparent by revealing hidden repos. The extent of increase in the volume of repos (above the increase caused by the conversion of hidden repos) is very hard to es ti mate, but liberalisation would likely result in a significant growth in repo turn over. In or der to ful fil pru dential requirements, some foreign participants currently do not make repo deals in Hungary; these companies would also step into the repo market given liberalisation. In the current economic situation, excess capital inflow can hinder or make the conduct of monetary policy ineffective. The recent global economic crisis urges central banks of converging coun tries to be more cau tious in taking fur ther steps towards liberalisation. It is not desirable for the withdrawal of speculative foreign capital to cause widespread and fundamentally unjustified capital movements, which in turn could cause the loss of confidence of for eign in vestors for a longer term. Thus it is likely that the liberalisation of foreign short term capital inflow cannot be implemented in the forthcoming few years, but it has to be done just prior to Hungary's EU membership at the latest.

In order to de velop the do mes tic repo mar ket, it would be very useful if market play ers learn the differ ences be tween repos and inter bank loans. In many cases they are not aware of their pos si bil i ties or just sim ply do not feel fa mil iar with repos. Many still for get that interbank repos are not subject to com pul sory reserver equire ments. Fears of potential losses arising from applying FIFO settlement should not be a prob lem ei ther; in case of hold-in-custody repos, the papers re main in the seller's prop erty so there is no chance of re valuation losses. It is also not reasonable that repos are con sid ered to fall within interbank loan limits, since the two deals have different risk fac tors. We think that if these and other ba sic ques tions could be clarified for all mar ket partic i pants, the currently 'stuck' repo mar ket could take off.

4.3.2 Characteristics of Hungarian market repos

On the initiative of ÁKK (Government Debt Management Agency) a wide group of market participants prepared a repo master agreement, which was based on the PSA/ISMA agreement and customised for the Hungarian market. In practice, dealers do not use this master agreement, because it does not provide an answer to many unclarified legal questions, and because, as mentioned earlier, repos are usu ally set tled as some other kind of deal in or der to evade regulations. Since the deals are not recorded in regular con tracts, they in volve very high risk. in or der to de velop the do mes tic repo mar ket, it would be very use ful if mar ket play ers learn the differencesbetween repos and in ter bank loans

repo mas ter agreement most repos are ini ti ated by for eign spec ulators

besidesspeculative deals, banks use repos for liquid ity management

popularmaturity

Repos in Hun gary are dom i nantly cash-driven deals, the spec ifications of the collateral being of sec ond ary importance. Most repos are initiated by for eign speculators hoping to gain profit on ex change rate movements, rather than expecting interest rate gains. These speculative deals are carried out in the form of repos because of the low risk granted by the collateral.

The other rea son for hav ing mostly cash-driven repos in Hungary is that besides speculative deals, banks use repos for liquidity management. Repos (or buy/sell-backs) are sometimes security-driven, but this hap pens mostly when un usual mar ket con di tions occur. (The spring of 1997 is a good example, when, in contrast to market expectations, the NBH increased its de posit rates, and dealers, expecting a quick readjustment of interest rates, sold large amounts of gov ern ment pa pers in the form of repos. In this way they were able to get rid of the papers which would temporarily cause them losses. These repos were definitely security driven and were not mo ti vated by the need for cash lend ing or bor row ing.)

Most recent statistics of the NBH prove that repos are dealt mostly between domestic and foreign dealers, and that the regulations set by the NBH are easily evaded by deal ers.

In terms of maturity, the most popular construction has been the one-month repo. This is be cause banks can bor row money from their partners with one-month repo while investing money in the NBH's one month de posit. This is a risk-free trans ac tion with se cure yield. Maturities between O/N and 30 days have also been popular, but there has been hardly any deal with maturity longer than a month. In many cases, original maturity was extended by the counterparts. Shortening of the maturity of the NBH's main instrument from one month to two weeks in March will prob a bly in volve a re duction in the du ra tion of busi ness repos.

4.3.3 Collateral management

primitivecollateral management Primitive collateral management applied to repos in Hungary increases the effectiveness of repo markets. Collateral is only evaluated at the beginning of the deal, and the extent of haircut depends on the de mand and sup ply side of the repo: the party who has more in ter est in mak ing the deal is usu ally the one who is will ing to give a better price. Marking to market is very rarely used, and this increases the risk of repos. The set tle ment sys tem of KELER is not yet ready for additional margining, so in the case of daily evaluation, marking to market could be implemented by closing the original deal and open ing a new repo. Lack of daily mark ing to mar ket and using debt consolidation government bonds as collateral means that repos usu ally in volve high hair cuts.

5. | The repo from central banking point of view

The cen tral banks have a dual function in relation to the repoin strument. Both functions are connected to different subperiods of the monetary transmission mechanism. On the one hand there is a significant function at the beginning of the transmission mechanism when the repois ap plied as a main in strument of monetary policy. In this case repois a tool for the monetary authority to reach its target by implying changes in the real economy through the transmission mech a nism. On the other hand repo can function as a feed back for monetary policy at a later period of the transmission. It is also an instrument for interest rate policy and liquidity management for the banks.

The next part of the chapter summarises the differences and advantages of the central banking repo in comparison with other tools of the same functions, and analyses which sort of repo is the most optimal for central banking pur poses. The following part gives a short over view on the history of Hun gar ian repo markets. The third part in ves tigates the role of repo as a tool of central banking op er ations, identifying the functions and the related Hungarian practice. The final section briefly presents the importance of the develop ment of market repo from the central banking point of view.

5.1 Place of repo within the instruments of monetary policy

Repo was first ap plied by the USA mon e tary au thor ity and the practice was later followed by the European central banks. Recently a large number of central banks have used repo as their leading instrument. Because of the very strong innovation of the repo and its associate constructions, the repo market is mushrooming. Repo has spread not only in differ ent forms, but also the vol ume of fi nancing with repo and the turnover of government bonds and bills had jumped up. the cen tral banks have a dual func tion in re la tion to the repo the repo in her ited the positivefunctions of the out right sale and pur chase of gov ern mentsecurities

the pri mary ad vantage of the repo is to be able to in fluence effec tively the op er ative interestrate and/or the mon e tary aggregate tar getof the cen tral bank with a smooth, stan dard and short ma turity

5.1.1 The advantages of repo over outright sale

The repo inherited the positive functions of the outright sale and purchase of government securities and introduced some new ones when integrated into the instruments of monetary policy. Using repurchase agreements, the central bank is able to intervene with standing facilities, with auctions, directly on the market or indirectly by quotation, similarly to the security prompt outright sale or purchase. Both of these in struments are use ful for an in tervention to reduce or increase monetary aggregates on the market, and thus market interestrates.

The primary ad van tage of the repo as a tool of the cen tral bank is to be able to influence effectively the operative interest rate and/or the monetary aggregate target of the central bank with a smooth, stan dard and short maturity. Ear lier, when the gov ern ment bond outright sale and pur chase was in volved as the main in strument of the central bank, the monetary authority could not avoid being tied to the remaining maturity and the liquidity of the bonds on the occasions of intervening. If the adequate amount of security was not available or its remaining maturity was not adequate, the central bank had to decide whether to intervene - possibly less effectively with a longer maturity, or try to use other instruments. Government bond sales and purchases were not always well advertised among the wider public, thus the beneficial effects of transparency of the central bank and the sufficient publicity were usually absent. Since only a small segment of the market was aware of the importance of the intervention, the signalling effect of the central bank was less powerful.

Repo transactions are not dependent on the extent of the government bond market and on the maturity of the collateral security, thus they are capable of always being used with fixed maturity. The fixed maturity means that central bank interest rate changes are more com parable and vis i ble. Repo can be ap plied as a standing facil ity or as a fixed in terest rate ten der (it is not easily feasible for outright sales and pur chases be cause of the different maturities).

The risk of price volatility under taken by the central bank is reduced, since the interest rate of the future "re pur chase" is fixed earlier. However, at the prompt intervention the central bank is not insured against the risk of price volatility un til the time of an in ter vention on the in verted side.

Applying asset side instruments, the repo is a well spread tool of cen tral banks. There are ad van tages of the repo over not only the prompt purchase, but also over the Lombard loan too (even if Lombard falls in the same category as repo in some as pects). Applying mark ing to mar ket is not typ i cal (al beit pos si ble) for Lombard loan, thus the col lat eral value is less for the trans ac tion, since mark-

Comparison of	repo and similar i	instruments of cen	Table4 tral banks
Asset side operation	Repo	Outright purchase	Lombardloan
Compability for auc tion sale	+	+	+
Compability forstandingfacility	+	+	+
Marked to market	+	-	+ (nottypical)
Collateralreplacement facility	+ (possible)	-	+ (possible)
Ma tu rities can be definied	+	-	+
Indirect transferability	+	-	+ (possible)

Table 5 Comparison of reverse repo and similar instruments of central banks			
Liability side intervention	Reverse repo	Outright sale	Deposit
Potential for auction sale	+	+	+
Potential for standing facility	As long as the gov. bond port fo lio lasts	As long as the gov portfoliolasts	+
Transferability	(indirectly)	+	(directly)
Markingto market	+	-	-
Ma tu rities are open todecision	+	_	+

ing to market is more spread for repo. Using a repo is also more advantageous because collateral substitution is a general practice, thus the cen tral bank is al ways cov ered against a price fall of the collateral, and the partner bank is not limited to deciding any time which part of his port fo lio can be used for the trans ac tions.¹

The ad van tages of repo de scribed above are effective only with a lon ger ma turity, since on O/N (or a cou ple of days) ma turity there is no possibility or economic rationality to apply marking to market or col lateral sub stitution. (There can be cases in a very liquid market using real time settlement where it is appropriate to apply intra-day valuationsor collateral substitution).

¹ In cen tral bank ing prac tice some times there are sim i lar in stru ments used in par al lel. Ea rlier, Lombard loans were used on O/N ma tu rity and repo on the two-week ma tu rity in Ger many.

ef fec tively there is no differencebetween the mar ket per formance of the pledged cen tral bank ing reverse repo and the de posit Among the liability side operations, the reverse repo can be well substituted by deposit since their monetary effects are the same. The only economic difference in their market roles can be found if the comparison is be tween the delivery repo and either the pledged or the deposit one.

Effectively there is no difference between the market performance of the pledged central banking reverse repo and the deposit. The formal difference is that towards the end of the transaction the central bank (or a cus to dian) keeps an ad e quate amount of security in custody as collateral for the partner in stitution, even though neither of the parties can use it for any thing. The part ner bank could obtain the collateral only if the central bank would not be able to re pay the cash at the for ward leg, but in practice this is im possible.

			Table6
Comparison of	the pledged, the de	livery reverse repo	and the deposit
	Pledged reverse repo	Delivery reverse repo	Deposit
Transferability	-	The col lat eral is trans fer able dur- ing the ma tu rity	-
Potentialfor standingfacility	As long as the port fo lio of the cen tral bank lasts	As long as the portfolioofthe central bank lasts	Unlimited
Sameconditions for each part ner	Yes	Hardlyfeasible	Yes
Poten tial for steri- lisation	As long as the port fo lio of the cen tral bank lasts	As long as the portfolioofthe central bank lasts	+
Potentialforfine tuning	+	+	+
Encouragesthe developmentof the money mar ket	+	+	+
Encouragesthe developmentof the gov. bond market	_	+	+

In their for mal at trib utes there are very few differ ences be tween the pledged cen tral bank ing re verse repo and the de posit. As re gards sterilisation purposes or the potential for ap ply ing them as standing facil i ties, the differ ence is that the pledged re verse repo can be used only as long as the gov ern ment bond stock of the cen tral bank lasts, while the de posit is un limited in this re spect.

5.1.2 Delivery and pledged repo among the instruments of the central bank

Financially there is no considerabledifference between the delivery and pledged repoin struments on the as set side activities of the central bank, since the central bank does not want to use the government securities during the repothere is no sense in keeping the papers. Pledging the collateral is easier.

As mentioned above, if there is trust in a cen tral bank it does not make much difference whether it ap plies reverse repoor deposit – given the same conditions. How ever, the delivery repois financially more divergent from the deposit or the pledged repo. Running a delivery repo, market partic i pants get not only the legal owner ship, but also the possession of the collateral, thus they can sell it, lend it or use it as collateral for an other trans action. Given this potential to use the collateral, the delivery repo must have some liquidity premium over the deposit. So the central bank could reach the same banking system liquidity target with lower interest rates applied to delivery repo. In any case, the external condition for applying reverse delivery repo is a very liquid government bond market.

The possibility of applying reverse delivery repo is very restricted, since the amount of securi ties el i gi ble for reverse repo in the treasury of the central bank is limited (this problem is solved if the central bank is able to issue security and use it as collateral – see later in the chapter). Further more, ap plying reverse delivery repois impossible, since to be more effective on the market and enjoy the advantages of this tool over the de posit (and set lower in terest rates) the cen tral bank has to pos sess huge amounts of gov ern ment se curities in demand. If a central bank does not con sider the types of govern ment bond a counterparty gets, and each counterparty could get differ ent sorts of pa pers in a reverse de livery repo, this would lead to several problems. How could the central bank decide which counterparty receives which security? If one counterparty obtains a more useful collateral paper than another for the same "price", it could damage the neutral position of the central bank.

This process could be similar in some ways to gambling, because at the time a counterparty ap plies for the reverse de livery repo, he is not aware of the type of collateral security he would possess.

Over all, the reverse de liv ery repo can be a via ble in strument of the cen tral bank for fine tuning pur poses. The most effective way to use reverse delivery repo involves the limited amount fixed interest rate ten der. Thus, se lecting the type of security to use as collateral the central bank can avoid running out of its stock of government paper. Of course, the amount of offer cannot exceed the amount of stock of the specified security in the central bank portfolio. The reverse delivery repo can only be used for fine tuning, since the central fi nan cially there is no considerable differ ence be tween the deliv ery and pledged repo in stru ments

the de liv ery repo is financially more diver gent from the de posit or the pledged repo

the pos si bil ity of apply ing reverse de livery repo is very restricted

aviableinstrument for fine tun ing purposes

Table 7 Possible roles of the repo applied by the NBH Repo Reverse repo Pledged repo This is the actual practice No rea son to use, since the de posit is a per fect sub stitute. (Ap plied by the NBH to Oc to ber 1997) This could have an im por tant There could have been some Deliveryrepo reason to use this if the cenrole in de vel op ing the money tral bank could (and would) mar ket. Given the small size use the col lat eral during maof the NBH, the use of it is lim ited. Fea si ble with BNH turity. bond use as collateral.

banks hardly have a large amount of the kind of se curi ties which can be efficiently be used for other then fine tuning purposes (sterilisation, creating structural liquidity short age).

NBH-bill col lat eral behind the re verse de liv ery repo In 1997, when the is sue of NBH bills was on the plan ning ta ble, one of the ideas was to is sue bills with ma tu rity lon ger than one year and use them as collateral in one-year reverse delivery repotrans actions, thus the bills could be transferred in the money market. One of the ben efits of this method could have been to in tervene permanently with one year and not between 10 and 12 months. Of course this method is feasible with a shorter repo maturity, e.g. a 6-month NBH bill can be the collateral behind a 2-week reverse delivery repo.

Applying delivery repo with the method described above implies eliminating the problem arising from the restricted amount of gov ern ment bond stock in the port fo lio of a cen tral bank, and in addition the delivery reverse repo can be used not only for fine tuning purposes.

5.1.3 Collateral valuation for central banking repo

As was the prac tice for mar ket repo, the cen tral bank val ued col lateral for repo in a very elementary way up to the end of 1998. The central bank considered the market value plus a haircut as adequate for col lat eral sub mit ted for repo, and dur ing the ma tu rity there was no mark ing to mar ket. For tu nately, there was no need for marking to mar ket, since the stock of repo was gen er ally low, the ma tu rities very short and hair cut dis count proved ad e quate to cover value losses of the collat eral se curity.

At the end of 1998 changes with the asset side instruments were implemented, and developing are liable and transparent valuation method became necessary. In December 1998 the Monetary Policy Committee of the NBH decided to implement a new method from 1 February 1999 and to value collateral in the same, transparent man ner for all the asset side oper ations. The hair cut dis count applied for collateral depends on the maturity; and there are two categories for the O/N and for longer maturities.

The longer run target for collateral valuation is to change to daily mark ing to mar ket, but to day this is restricted by the infra structure of the NBH and also of KELER (settlement house). The system of daily collateral valuation is the most effective and modern system, which ensures the automatic daily monitoring and adjust ment of the value of collateral and the transaction, security substitution and collateral pool management. Collateral pool manage ment means that the part ner in stitution does not need to satisfy the collateral needs for each trans action one-by-one if over- or under-collateralised, but for all.

At the end of 1998 the NBH accepted a proposal for KELER to initiate the development of a daily collateral valuation system. These developments are encouraging not only the smooth operation of central banking repo, but also the better valuation and the collateral substitution of business repo. Hopefully, the development of NBH collateral valuation will help business sector repo too, since re-evaluating the collateral on a daily ba sis will lead to smaller haircut requirements (less collateral for the same transaction), and to the low est risk of un der-collateralisation.

5.2 The history of central banking repo in Hungary

In Hun gary the in stru ment called repo was ap plied for the first time in 1993. A prerequisite for repo introduction was a relatively well developed government securities market. On the basis of a dynamically developing government securities market the NBH changed its tools of operations from direct refinancing (assisted by interbank loans) to forward government bond re purchase trans actions.


The cen tral bank in tro duced reverse repo as a stand ing facility, meanwhile repo was applied with a quantity limit set for each bank. The NBH fixed the individual limit on the basis of the size of a commercial bank's balance sheet. Initially the repo outstandings were quite sub stantial, since new method from 1 Feb ru ary 1999

daily mark ing to market tar get for col lat eralvaluation

repo was ap plied for the first time in 1993

quan tity limit set for each bank

- there were in creased li quid ity needs of some banks in trou ble before and during bank consolidation and
- the NBH gradually continued the process of changing from central bank budget financing to market financing, thus sometimes there was a clear arbitrage gap be tween the repo and the T-Bill interestrates.



At that time the banks had to keep "liquidity reserve" and the most op timal in strument for this was government securities. This be come an obstacle to the development of a repo market, since these securities were not available for any trans actions, thus not for repo. This could be one of the rea sons why cur rency swaps (with the same conditions) became increasinglypopular.

In February 1994 the central bank ceased the two-week, the six-month and the twelve-month repo facility and also the six and the twelve-month reverse repo, and introduced the two-week repo standing facility with fixed interest rate. In May a new technique of repo sale was introduced; two-week reverse repo was auctioned. This technique was viable until June and the maximumvolume involved was Ft 14 bil lion, but from then on the bank ing sys tem li quidity be gan to shrink and in ter estrate expectations rose.

On 5 September 1994 the NBH ceased the three-month repo and reverse repo facility, and in December the one-month repo financing facility was also closed. Thus the longer maturity instruments were gradually running out and they were only partly substi-

theaveragematurity of repoin struments were grad u ally shortened tuted by the shorter maturity as set side operations. In addition, from that time the set of maturities of the monetary instruments of the central bank were entirely different from the maturities of the instruments for budget deficit financing.

From the third quar ter of 1995 the re verse repo outstandings of the NBH started to increase sharply and the position of the banking system against the central bank turned to the opposite, liabilityside. From 5 Sep tem ber 1995 the o/n re verse repo was also ap plied, and the o/n interest rate corridor took shape. From October the twoweek re verse repo were ap plied as a standing facility in stead of auctioning.

In May 1996 ceasing the two-week reverse repofacility limited the possibilities of the banks in terms of pledging excess liquidity with the NBH. The "repogap" was widening, since the o/n reverse interest rates of the NBH were reduced by 4.5 per cent age points, while the o/n repointerest rate was lowered only by 2.75 percentage points. The repo proved to be an excellent instrument for sterilising excess liquidity arising from for eign currency inflow.

During 1997 the NBH faced a rapidly increasing amount of sterilisation outstanding, while the government securities available to use as collateral in a reverse repo were limited. To avoid the problem emerging from the short age of collateral securities for repo, the central bank substituted the one-month reverse repo by one month deposit. The deposit differed from the reverse only with one condition, the NBH did not put collateral be hind the trans action.

In 1998, in changing the general conditions for the instruments of the central bank, the repo and the deposit were also concerned. One-week repo ceased, and from the end of the year the system of repo limits – unchanged from 1995 – was revised and made more flexible.

In 1999 there some mea sures were taken to mod ify repo con ditions, making the instrumentsmoreflexible. From 5 January 1999 repo and reverse repo quicktenders be came a new avail able form of instrument for the central bank after the modification of the "General conditions of the NBH money market oper ations". Application of reverse repo is only a theoretical possibility in the near future, but in the lon ger run it can be feasible. There was a precedent in Janu ary for using repo quicktender (twice), after the operations within the limit proved too small for some banks, and they were not able to manage their liquidity. These repo quicktenders were fixed interest rate tenders with quantity limit, but the "Generalconditions" allow the NBH to call for each tender form (interest rate tender, quantity tender, unlimitedcondition tender) and the maturities are also very flexible. the o/n in terest rate corri dor took shape

the "repo gap" was widening

the cen tral bank substi tuted the re verse repo by the de posit

in 1999 repo and reverse repo quicktenders be came a new avail able form of in stru ment for the cen tral bank

5.3 Functions of central banking repo

5.3.1 Controlling money supply by repo

The central bank is capable of affecting the money in circulation by many means. When the money market or the banking system is short of liquidity the repo is an appropriate tool for placing liquidity. And vice-versa, when there is ex cess liquid ity in the market, cen tral bank ing reverse repo is a suitable in strument to ab sorb the quantity of actual money.

Central banking repo can be applied in several ways to affect the monetary aggregates. The most widespread ones are the auctions and the standing facilities. Auctions with pre-fixed (offered) quantity have naturally limited effect on the monetary aggregates. But if the standing facility is used to con trol the amount of money on the mar ket, it has to be com bined with a quan tity limit.

In Hungary open market operations were first introduced in 1993. From that time to 1995 the central bank ing repo was very effective, and it had a strict quantity limit (changes of the repo limit can be found in Ap pen dix No.1.). The NBH de vel oped its repo op erations on the basis of directrefinancing. Thus there were many maturities on the standing facilities, and a limit on the daily amount of trans ac tions and later limit on the stock.

At that time the limit had a double function. First, according to the function of "lender of last resort" (see next point) it selected the troubled banks which needed even more liquidity from among the repo part ners. Sec ond, from the mon e tary policy point of view it limited the potential amount of the central banking money flow to the market.

In 1999, as the importance of liquid ity man agement is growing, the effectivity of the limit is also more important; however, the benefits of maintaining such a limit are doubtful. With repo tenders and quicktenders the limit is al ready not used. The limit refers only to the o/n repo and swap.

5.3.2 "Lender of last resort" function

the ac cel er ated li quidityproblems would prob a bly endanger the bank ing or the set tle ment system The central bank fulfils the "Lender of last resort" function if any bank or credit institution has a huge individual and temporary liquid ity problem, which is im possible to solve within the nor mal conditions of the banking industry and which, without central banking intervention, the accelerated liquidity problems would probably endanger the bank ing or the set tle ment system.

open mar ket op er ations and a strict quan tity limit There are many tools which can be applied to ful fil the "Lender of last resort" function. It could in volve an emer gency loan, par tial or entire exemption from satisfying the reserve requirement, or, as the mild est so lution, repo within or over the limit.

Taking ad van tage of the repo can be done only with the ap propriate amount of collateral. Earlier, selling a larger portfolio on a shallow government bond market could be disadvantageous (result in loss), or even im pos si ble in some cases, thus it was an easier so lution to turn to the cen tral bank and ask for repo fi nance. How ever, the central bank tried to avoid giv ing funds at close to the mar ket rate to a bank experiencing a major and not merely a temporary liquidity short age. That was one of the rea sons for in tro duc ing the emer gency repo over the repo limit. This is lim ited only by the gov ern ment se curity stock of the bank, but its interest rate is essentially higher than that for repo within the limit.

5.3.3 Repo as interest rate policy instrument

The cen tral bank can also ap ply repo with a fixed in ter est rate term. Usually this is the most influential (benchmark) inter est rate for the money market, since partners of the central bank can always receive short ma tu rity funds at this cost. Changing these repo rates is also a very important signal for the banks, since, if the operations are effective, it has an im por tant in fluence on the whole money market. One of the main benefits of the central bank ing repo is that the central bank can in duce a great effect with a rel a tively small ac tual business operation – it can show the market participants the expected ideal level of interestrate.

In Hun gary the three months li a bil ity side in strument was as sociated with the benchmark interest rate. Applying that instrument the NBH was able to influence most effectively the basic unit of the credit market, the three-month credit. On the one hand, the central bank has to influence effectively the basic unit of credit pricing – in Hun gary the three months credit (since the fix ing period for a flex i ble in ter est-bearing credit is three months). On the other hand, a cen tral bank has to in ter vene on an ap pro pri ate and per ma nently de ter miningmaturity.

The larger, more open and more liquid the money market a country possess, the shorter the maturity with which a central bank is able to influence effectively the yield curve by employing determined interest rates. If a longer-term instrument has attractive (or seemingly attractive) conditions and a healthily operating money market has opposite expectations to the central bank, the market partic i pants are able to con centrate huge strength and so the central bank can hardly, or only with high cost, maintain the instrument.

tak ing ad van tage of the repo

the cen tral bank can also ap ply repo with a fixed in ter est rate term

the repo can func tion as the instrument for the main rate of the cen tral bank Oth er wise, if the con di tions of this in stru ment are not at trac tive, the direct interest rate determination of the central bank would be ineffective.

From March 1999 the NBH influences the three months credit pricing with a two-week (benchmark) fixed-interest instrument. (However, this is not reverse repo, but deposit today, but the effect would have been the same with the asset side repo). The maturity shortening (from one month) was necessary not only for liquidity management reasons, but also because of the quality and quantity development of the money market.

Repo rates were always important measures for the banking sector, even dur ing the early pe riod of repo – mainly in 1994 – when limits were exceeded and the interbank rates ran above the repo rates.

the role of the repo in the in ter est rate cor ridor The o/n central bank ing rates form a corridor for the inter bank rates. On the up per edge of the corridor, the inter est rate of the emergency repois the the oretical maximum. In the practice, how ever, the normative reporate is the higher edge, except when an unforeseen liquidity problem occurs.

5.3.4 Repo for sterilisation

Cen tral bank ing re verse repo is also use ful for soak ing up ex cess liquidity in the money market. Financially, credit institutions place their ex cess funds and the central bank places collateral behind it. For the part ner bank the re verse repo is more ben e fi cial then the de posit if the collateral received is transferable during the repo transaction. In practice, the pledged reverse repo (which the NBH applied un til 1997) has no ad van tage for the mar ket over the de posit.

From July 1995 the NBH sterilised a gradually increasing amount. In the early period of sterilisation, there was only a very small amount of outright government bond sales in addition to the reverse repo. The reverse repo (or the deposit) is perfectly capable of sterilising market liquidity.

In place of the repo and short term deposit, lon ger term deposits (6 and 12 months) and the NBH Bill were in troduced for a period of time to lengthen the du ra tion of the steri lised outstandings.

5.3.5 Liquidity management by repo

A central bank can apply repo on both sides (credit and deposit side), so if necessary it can bal ance the li quid ity short age as well as the sur plus of the market. To be able to intervene effectively on the money market when necessary, the central bank has to have a pre-

sterilisation with reverserepo cise li quid ity fore cast, and an in stru ment which can be ap plied very quickly. In tro ducing the flex i ble repo as an in stru ment can serve the liquidity management purposes of the central bank in the form of ten ders or quicktenders.

The monetary trends of 1998 and the fall of sterilised outstandings in Sep tem ber pre pared a good basis for monitoring the movements of market liquidity more effectively, and, when necessary, for intervention. To reduce the volatility of interbank rates and to reduce the effect of a potential shock a large currency exchange outflow can induce, the NBH built several instruments of liquidity management into its operations.

From 1999, the new "General Conditions" introduced the poten tial in struments for more active liquid ity management. They also en cour age the central bank to develop the frame work of a mone tary policy which can actively reduce in flation, even within a modified exchange rate system.

It is possible to offer repo (or deposit) on a normative tender, but in the beginning of 1999 there was no rea son for it. How ever, the (also new) quicktender was ap plied twice in Jan u ary.

5.4 Importance of market repo for the central bank

Considering the more effective monetary transmission mechanism and in for mation about mar ket trends, the central bank con siders as one of its targets to as sist the develop ment of the money mar ket. Of course, this objective is not more important than the direct targets of monetary policy.

Development of the repomarket encourages the formation of a deeper, more liquid money market. The credit limits set between banks for each other de fine its essence, if the risk is covered by liquid government securities. Trading the security received as collateral is possible during the maturity if delivery transaction is applied. Thus there is a nat ural need for a liquid government securi ties market, secure legal infrastructure, and an adequate trading and set tlement environment.

Spreading market repo is important, since it encourages riskless and short-run credit op er a tions. With out a repo mar ket there is no security behind short credit, thus interest rates are higher to cover the ex cess risk or the costs are higher for the party in need of money, due to the transaction costs of the collateralisation. Credit costs can be made lower by establishing and implementing a repo mar ket, and so the short ma turity in ter est rates can also be shrunk.

from 1999 new po tential in stru ments for moreactiveliquidity management be came available

trading the security received as collateral is possible during the maturity if delivery trans action is applied

spreading market repois im portant, since it en cour ages riskless and shortrun credit operations the possi bil ity of the NBH for the de vel op ment of the repo market The NBH is capable of, and intends to encourage the development of the Hungarian repo market by initiating some measures. First, it can examine the regulatory and legal environment, as to whether it is capable of offering an optimal frame work for the develop ment of the repo or not. If some com plicating factor is dis covered, it can propose a mea sure to deal with it.

Second, the central bank can look at its operations and examine the possible modifications in favour of the development of the repomarket (without efficiency loss for mone tary policy).

Third, it can assist bond-dealers and liquidity managers to be even more aware of the potential advantages and attributes of repo.

Furthermore, the central bank is ready to assist setting up a general agreement on repo transactions if it is necessary, to make the repo more secure and standardised, thus making it easier to book them. Finally, the NBH can initiate ways to simplify the techniques of settlement, to develop a collateral daily valuation system and the facilityforsubstitutingcollateral.

Appendix

Appendix No. 1

Changes of central banking repo limit in Hungary

The amount of repo stock a part ner bank can have was lim ited from the be gin ning. There was a nat u ral limit too, be ing the amount of the freely transfer able gov ern ment se curi ties in the bank port folio ap plicable for collateralisation. The NBH also set up an artificial limit in 1993, since there were some banks with serious liquidity problems and the uncontrolled rise of monetary ag gre gates was not desirable.

In the early years of central banking repo, the repo had a daily trans ac tion limit. That means that the daily max i mum amount of oper a tions per each bank were framed for each ma tu rity. The limit was set on the basis of the bal ance sheet to tal of the counterparty banks. This was also important because the central bank had physically limited capacity in the deal ing room. Effectively, at that time, this did not function as a limit in practice since the to tal limit (Ft 472 bil lion) was much higher than the demand. It was a more theoretical limit, because it could halt any sharp rise of repo outstandings from one day to an other. In March 1995 there was a rad i cal cut in these limits, thus making them effective. The repo became unsuitable for the function of "Lender of last re sort" in the long run.

The large re duc tions of the repo limit oc curred in 1995. Dur ing the early months, main tain ing the trans ac tion limit method, the limits were cut twice. In the second half of the year the method itself changed, and a limit di rectly on the stock was in tro duced (this is still in use). After the final change of the year, the banking system total limit was reduced to Ft 63.5 billion. However, liquidity shortage on the market started to disappear, thus even this strict limit had little effect.

After the 1 September 1995 modification, the limits and categories were unchanged for a lengthy period. Three years later, in 1998, the bank balance sheets were so diverse that the differences be tween categories were not ap propriate for the differences be tween banks. And after the international crises the possibility of a longer term liquid ity short age was loom ing, and it ap peared the credit in stitutions would be more willing to apply for central bank ing repo. Preparing for that, the NBH made a new system of limit, but still used the stock limit method.


Themodification ended the categories and the banks are automatically entitled to the amount in the limit, which is revised once every three months. The new limit regulation gives the banks a close to fixed percentage of their balance sheet total as maximum repo limit. The size of the limit is Ft 200 mil lion, plus Ft 200 mil lion for every Ft 10 billion of the balance sheet total, but it can never be more than Ft 12 billion, or Ft 20 billion from 1 June 1999.

				Table 1
Changes of the transaction limit in 1995				
	Ft billion			
Transaction limit	From 20 N	larch 1995	From 2 N	1ay 1995
Balancesheet total of the	Maximum stock a bank	How much of the maximum	Maximum stock a bank	How much of themaximum
bank	can hold utilis- ing the full daily trans ac- tion limit ev ery	one week ma- tu rity repo	can hold uti lis- ing the full daily trans ac- tion limit ev ery	stock can be in one week maturityrepo
	day		day	
Above 400 100-400	- 8,00	- 1,00	8,00 5,00	0,50 0,50
20–100 10–20	2,00 1,00	1,00 0,50	2,00 0,60	0,25 0,10
Bellow 10	0,50	0,25	0,18	0,08
To tal repo limit of the sec tor		220,00		130,00

		Table2		
Changes of the stock repo limit in 1995				
		Ftbillion		
Stock limit system	Maximum daily repo stock			
Bal ance sheet to tal of the bank	From the 1 July 1995	From the 1 Sep tem ber 1995		
Above 400	10,0	8,0		
100-400	7,0	4,2		
35–100	3,0	1,8		
15–35	1,0	0,6		
Below 15	0,5	0,3		
To tal repo limit of the sec tor	102,5	63,5		

NATIONAL BANK OF HUNGARY





Repo, reverse repo and deposit in the "General Conditions of the Forint Money Market Operations"

From 4 January 1999 a modified version of the "General Conditions" came into operation, involving some changes for central bank ing repo.

The pledged reverse repo and the deposit are, legally, treated differently in the regulation, but their economic content is basically the same.

Central banking repo can be sold in several forms. The NBH can apply standing facility, periodic standing facility (open only on some days as standing facility), tender and quicktender. Delivery repo can also be ap plied.

The differences of quicktender in relation to tender are as follows:

• the time for bids is only 30 min utes, as against 3 hours,

 there is 30 minutes for the evaluation of bids, as against 2 hours,

• T-day set tle ment, as against T+1,

• only banks are allowed to participate, as against banks plus special credit institutions,

• the NBH only ac cepts bids com ing by Reuters Deal ing, not by fax,

• one in stitution can make only one bid, as against the five.

The tenders can ap pear in many forms such as fixed quantity tender, fixed interest rate tender, limited quantity fixed interest rate tender or un conditioned tender (no prefixed amount and interest).

The interest rate tender is basically the same as the periodic standing facility. The NBH accepts each bid on the prefixed interest rate. The interest rate tender differs from the periodic standing facility in some formal aspects (making the offer, publishing the result, etc.) and in the regularity of their occasions; the call for a tender is not regular, but refers to a discrete date.

The limited quantity fixed interest rate tender differs from the interest rate tender in the quantity limit. Thus in this case the NBH accepts bids only up to the limit. The NBH maintains the right to change the amount of offer after the bids are submitted. If demand exceeds the offer, the bids are allocated proportion ately.

In call ing for a quan tity ten der, only the amount of fered is fixed in ad vance. The counterparties bid for the interest rate ac com pa nying the amount. The NBH accepts the most beneficial bids in order, up to the amount of the of fer as an up per limit. The NBH also has the right to change the amount of offer after the bids are sub mit ted.

Theunconditional tender call contains the date, maturity subtype, but not the interest rate and the amount. The counter parts give bids for the interestrate associated with an amount, and after all the bids are sub mit ted the NBH ar ranges them to or der and starts to accept them from the most to the least ad van ta geous up to a limit that ap pears ideal for the NBH.

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