Can structural reforms help Europe? by Gauti Eggertson, Andrea Ferrero and Andrea Raffo

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### Research question: Can structural reforms help Europe?

- Europe is facing a protracted stagnation period.
- Periphery was hit due to mounting "macroeconomic imbalances".
- **Not surprisingly** structural reforms are at the centre stage of the policy debate.

### How do structural reforms work?

- Increase competition in labour and NT goods markets
  - trigger a "real devaluation" (competitiveness effect);
  - **boost** expectations about **future growth** (wealth effect).

"... we model structural reforms ... as a permanent reduction in product and labour market markups." (page 4)

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### Open-economy New Keynesian DSGE model of monetary union

- **2-country**: core and periphery.
- **2-sector**: tradables and non-tradables.
- Labour is the only productive factor (implicitly **fixed K stock**).
- Monopolistic competition in intermediate goods production.
- Government follows a **balanced budget fiscal rule**.

### Structural reforms

- **Subsidies** to NT sector wages & prices
  - $\Rightarrow$  supply goods & hours closer to perfect competition.
- Price and wage markups remain unchanged!

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### On the impact of the structural reforms (full credibility)

- Long run impacts unambiguously positive in output.
- Short run impacts depend on monetary policy & credibility:
  - "Normal" times: central bank cuts policy rate
    - $\Rightarrow$  Prices decline, real interest rate falls & output <u>booms</u> on impact.
  - "Crisis" times: zero lower bound is binding
    - $\Rightarrow$  Prices decline, real interest rate rises & output <u>falls</u> on impact.

### On the impact of the structural reforms (no credibility)

- "Crisis" times + reform is reverted due to political tensions.
- Very large output fall on impact (no wealth effect).
- No long-run impact.

### Alternative policies may alleviate short run perverse effects.

### "New Deal" (builds on Eggertson, 2012)

- Grant firms and unions temporarily higher monopoly power.
- **Temporary higher inflation** eliminates real interest rate rise.
- Limits output decline on impact.

### "Delay" (builds on Fernandez-Villaverde, 2012)

- Credibly commit to reforms, when ZLB is not binding.
- Future reforms **boosts demand today** (wealth effect).
- Boosts output on impact.

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5 / 15

### Conclusions

- Structural reforms may help to regain competitiveness.
- **Timing** of implementation is **crucial**:
  - Under ZLB, deflation can deepen the recession;
  - Even worse if reform is unwind due to political tensions.
- Assess "New Deal" and "Delay":
  - **Creates stimulus** by creating inflation or boosting demand;
  - Can be combined to maximize impact on output.

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6 / 15

# Research question: Can structural reforms help Europe?

### Structural reforms always help!

- Better resource allocation  $\Rightarrow$  welfare improving.
- Under ZLB, induce output losses in the short-run.
- Impact on welfare? Output  $\neq$  welfare.
- Small euro area countries are always in a ZLB.
  - Shouldn't adopt structural reforms? Sure, they need it!
  - **Policy coordination** matters to optimize impact.
- Article is too focused in the short-run impacts.
- Long-run impacts are key in structural reforms.

 $\therefore$  Title should refer explicitly to short-run issues or article should address long-run benefits and welfare.

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### What is a structural reform?

- Legislative changes that **improve resource allocation**.
  - Remove barriers to entry, increase #players.
  - Fight competition harming practices, improve regulation.
  - Eliminate rents in monopolistic sectors.
  - **Parameters**: EoS in monopolistic sectors, eventually TFP.
- In this paper, subsidies to labour and production:

$$P_k = \left(\frac{1}{1 - \tau_k^p}\right) \left(\frac{\theta_k}{\theta_k - 1}\right) M C_k \quad \text{where} \quad \frac{\theta_k}{\theta_k - 1} \quad \text{is the markup.}$$

- Induce workers and NT firms to supply closer to competitive level;
- Distortionary subsidies financed through lump-sum taxes.

**Question**: Markups unchanged! Is this a structural reform?

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### No role for K and investment

#### • Structural reforms aim at increase investment

- Reforms induce cuts in prices and wages  $\Rightarrow$  inflation declines.
- Under ZLB, real interest rate increases.
- L-intensity & marginal productivity of K increase
  ⇒ higher return on K
- Under K adjustment costs, firms invest more.
- In this paper, no K channel:
  - Higher real interest rate brings consumption down.

Question: K channel plays a key role. Why is it absent?

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### Limited impact in trade balance and NFA


- Structural reforms aim at **re-balancing the economy**:
  - Reduction in NT wage and price markups brings prices down.
  - Resources reallocated towards tradables:
    - $\Rightarrow$  **Improvement in competitiveness** and in trade balance;
  - Strong positive impact in the long-run.
- In this paper, structural reforms barely affect trade balance.
  - No resource reallocation between sectors (figure 5);
  - Tradables prices increase & competitiveness gains (?);
  - What is the real exchange rate? Relative price of tradables?
  - Competitiveness impacts are minor.

Question: What drives competitiveness in the model?

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# Some DSGE model features may affect results




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11 / 15

## Some DSGE model features may affect results



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### This paper: full credibility vs. failed structural reform

- **Shock**: temporary reform (higher subsidies)
  - Government announces a reform;
  - Agents *correctly* anticipate reform reversion (political tension);
  - Only pain (recession), no gain (no wealth effect).

### My suggestion: full credibility vs. imperfect credibility

- **Shock**: temporary reform + **permanent** 
  - Government announces a reform;
  - Agents *incorrectly* anticipate reform reversion (political tension);
  - Reform **becomes credible** after some period;
  - **Protracted initial pain** (recession), long-run gain.

### "New Deal": generate inflation to move away from ZLB

- Structural reforms in the model are subsidies;
- Generate inflation by increasing taxes that revert the subsidy?!
- Essentially, not doing the structural reform.

### "Delay": commit to do reforms when ZLB is not binding

- Credibility bring forward wealth effects;
- How to commit credibly? Requires bulletproof credibility;
- Misses political economy of reforms (Rodrik 2000,2008):
  - Deeper reforms easier to implemented in crisis times;
  - Crisis reduces rents and so vested interests resistance!

### Question: Is the short-lived recession important? Welfare?

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## Comments and suggestions

- Good paper on a very important topic.
- The paper is very well motivated!
- Mickey-model is very useful to get some intuition.
- Long-run impacts should be emphasised. Overly focused in the short-run.
- Production block should **accommodate K accumulation**.
- Reforms should be implemented through **EoS**, not as a subsidy.
- Assess impact of **imperfect credibility** vs. full credibility.
- Alternative policies, are they necessary?
  - Are **reforms welfare improving**? Hopefully yes.
  - Can alternative policies improve further? Not clear!

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