
International Debt Deleveraging


Luca Fornaro CREI and Universitat Pompeu Fabra

12th Macroeconomic Policy Research Workshop Budapest, September 2013


Motivating facts: Household debt/GDP



Motivating facts: Current account/GDP



Motivating facts: GDP



Research questions

- What happens when a group of financially integrated countries enters a process of debt deleveraging?
- What role does the exchange rate regime play?



- Provides a framework for understanding debt deleveraging in a group of financially integrated countries
- Key result: monetary unions are particularly prone to enter a liquidity trap during deleveraging

Overview of the framework

- World featuring a continuum of small open economies
- Foreign borrowing/lending is used to smooth the impact of idiosyncratic productivity shocks on consumption
- The deleveraging process is triggered by an unexpected permanent decrease in the (exogenous) borrowing limit

Overview of the results

- An unexpected drop in the borrowing limit generates a fall in the world interest rate
- With flexible exchange rates, production shifts toward high debt countries
- In a monetary union with nominal wage rigidities
 - The fall in the interest rate is amplified
 - Liquidity trap is associated with deep recession, especially in high-debt countries

Related literature

- Exchange rate regime and crises: Cespedes, Chang and Velasco (2004), Christiano, Gust and Roldos (2004), Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci (2007), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2011)
- Deleveraging and liquidity traps: Eggertsson and Krugman (2010), Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2010), Benigno and Romei (2012)



A model of international deleveraging

Deleveraging with flexible wages

Deleveraging in a monetary union with nominal wage rigidities

The zero lower bound

Policy experiments



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Model

- World composed of a continuum of small open economies
- Each economy is inhabited by a continuum of measure 1 of households and by a large number of firms

Household

• Expected lifetime utility in country i

$$E_0\left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U\left(C_{i,t}^T, C_{i,t}^N, L_{i,t}\right)\right]$$

Budget constraint

$$C_{i,t}^{T} + p_{i,t}^{N} C_{i,t}^{N} + \frac{B_{i,t+1}}{R_{t}} = w_{i,t} L_{i,t} + B_{i,t} + \Pi_{i,t}$$

Borrowing constraint

$$B_{i,t+1} \ge -\kappa$$



Tradable sector

$$Y_{i,t}^T = A_{i,t}^T \left(L_{i,t}^T \right)^{\alpha_T}$$

• $A_{i,t}^T$ is a country-specific productivity shock

Non-tradable sector

$$Y_{i,t}^N = A^N \left(L_{i,t}^N \right)^{\alpha_N}$$

Market clearing

Tradable consumption good

$$C_{i,t}^{T} = Y_{i,t}^{T} - \frac{B_{i,t+1}}{R_t} + B_{i,t}$$

Non-tradable consumption good

$$C_{i,t}^N = Y_{i,t}^N$$

Labor

$$L_{i,t} = L_{i,t}^T + L_{i,t}^N$$

World market clearing

$$\int_0^1 C_{i,t}^T \mathrm{d}i = \int_0^1 Y_{i,t}^T \mathrm{d}i \Longleftrightarrow \int_0^1 B_{i,t+1} \,\mathrm{d}i = 0$$

Some useful definitions

The stock of net foreign assets owned by country i at the end of period t is

$$NFA_{i,t} = \frac{B_{i,t+1}}{R_t}$$

Current account

$$NFA_{i,t} - NFA_{i,t-1} = CA_{i,t} = Y_{i,t}^T - C_{i,t}^T + B_{i,t} \left(1 - \frac{1}{R_{t-1}}\right)$$

Functional forms

Preferences

$$U\left(C^{T}, C^{N}, L\right) = \frac{C^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} - \frac{L^{1+\psi}}{1+\psi}$$

$$C = \left(C^{T}\right)^{\omega} \left(C^{N}\right)^{1-\omega}$$

Productivity shock


$$A_{i,t}^T = \rho A_{i,t-1}^T + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

Parameters


	Value	Source/Target
Risk aversion	$\gamma = 4$	Standard value
Discount factor	$\beta=0.9756$	R = 1.025
Frisch elasticity of labor supply	$1/\psi = 1$	Kimball and Shapiro (2008)
Labor share in trad. sector	$\alpha_T = 0.65$	Standard value
Labor share in non-trad. sector	$\alpha_N = 0.65$	Standard value
Share of trad. in consumption	$\omega = 0.5$	Stockman and Tesar (1995)
TFP process	$\sigma_{\epsilon}=0.0194$	Benigno and Thoenissen (2008)
	$\rho=0.84$	
Initial borrowing limit	$\kappa = 0.9$	Debt/GDP= 20%

Table 1: Parameters (annual)

Policy functions



Distribution of net foreign assets/GDP



Net foreign assets/GDP

Deleveraging shock

- Start from steady state with $\kappa = \kappa^H$
- \blacktriangleright Unexpected permanent drop to $\kappa = \kappa^L < \kappa^H$
- I set κ^L = 0.75κ^H (in the final steady state world debt/GDP is 15 percent) graph



A model of international deleveraging


Deleveraging with flexible wages

Deleveraging in a monetary union with nominal wage rigidities


The zero lower bound

Policy experiments

Transitional dynamics



Impact response across the NFA distribution



Wage rigidities and the nominal exchange rate

Nominal wages adjust slowly to shocks

 Movements in the nominal exchange rate can act as a substitute for nominal wage flexibility Equations

Proposition

From the perspective of a single country the flexible wage equilibrium attains the constrained optimum.



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A monetary union

Budget constraint in terms of currency

$$P_t^T C_{i,t}^T + P_{i,t}^N C_{i,t}^N + \frac{B_{i,t+1}}{R_t^N} = W_{i,t} L_{i,t} + B_{i,t} + \Pi_{i,t}$$

- Bonds are denominated in units of currency
- Borrowing limit

$$\frac{B_{i,t+1}}{P_{t+1}^T} \ge -\kappa$$

Central bank


- There is a single central bank that uses R^N as its policy instrument
- Start by considering a central bank that targets zero inflation in the tradable sector

$$P_{t+1}^T = P_t^T$$


Nominal wage rigidities

- Nominal wages are fixed in the short run (period 0)
- From period t = 1 wages are fully flexible

Transitional dynamics in a monetary union



Impact response across the NFA distribution





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
The zero lower bound

Policy experiments


The zero lower bound

- Define R^N_t as the nominal interest rate consistent with the inflation target
- Now monetary policy is given by $R_t^N = MAX\left(\hat{R}_t^N, 1\right)$
- During period 0, the price of the tradable good has to fall to guarantee market clearing
- Two effects
 - Employment in the tradable sector decreases
 - Fisher's debt-deflation: the real debt burden increases

Transitional dynamics in a liquidity trap



Impact response across the NFA distribution





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
The zero lower bound

Policy experiments


Policy experiments

- One period is a quarter
- Persistent nominal wage rigidities
- Gradual tightening of the borrowing limit


Transitional dynamics



Changing the inflation target



"Soft landing"



Conclusion

- Main message: monetary unions are particularly prone to enter a liquidity trap during deleveraging
- Other policy tools
 - Fiscal transfers and debt relief policies (Fornaro 2013)



Household's optimality conditions

$$p_{i,t}^{N} = \frac{U_{C_{i,t}^{N}}}{U_{C_{i,t}^{T}}}$$

- -

$$-U_{L_{i,t}} = w_{i,t} U_{C_{i,t}}^{T}$$

$$\frac{U_{C_{i,t}^T}}{R_t} = \beta E_t \left[U_{C_{i,t+1}^T} \right] + \mu_{i,t}$$

 $B_{i,t+1} \ge -\kappa$, with equality if $\mu_{i,t} > 0$,



Nominal wage rigidities and the exchange rate

 Define S_i as country i nominal exchange rate against the key international currency

$$P_{i,t}^T = S_{i,t} P_t^T$$

• Normalize $P^T = 1$, firms' labor demand implies

$$L_{i,t}^{T} = \left(\alpha_{T} A_{i,t}^{T} \frac{S_{i,t}}{W_{i,t}}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha_{T}}}$$

Back

The current account

$$CA_{i,t} = Y_{i,t}^T - C_{i,t}^T + B_{i,t} \left(1 - \frac{1}{R_{t-1}}\right)$$

Back

Real exchange rate and production of non-tradables

Real exchange rate


$$P_{i,t}^N = \frac{1 - \omega}{\omega} \frac{C_{i,t}^T}{C_{i,t}^N} P_t^T$$

Equilibrium labor in the non-tradable sector


$$L_{i,t}^{N} = \left(\alpha_{N}A^{N}\frac{P_{i,t}^{N}}{W_{i,t}}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha_{N}}}$$

Back


Motivating facts: Household debt/GDP




Motivating facts: Current account/GDP



Motivating facts: CA deficits and unemployment



Eurozone: net debtors NFA/GDP



A model with interest rate spreads

 Suppose households in country i are charged the interest rate R_{i,t}

$$U_{C_{i,t}^T} = R_{i,t}\beta E_t \left[U_{C_{i,t+1}^T} \right]$$

Assuming the borrowing constraint in the main text

$$U_{C_{i,t}^T} = \frac{R_t}{1 - \frac{\mu_{i,t}R_t}{U_{C_{i,t}^T}}} \beta E_t \left[U_{C_{i,t+1}^T} \right]$$

The two models are isomorphic if

$$R_{i,t} = \frac{R_t}{1 - \frac{\mu_{i,t}R_t}{U_{C_{i,t}^T}}}$$

► and if the spread R_{i,t} - R_t is rebated to households in country i through lump-sum transfers